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Abstract 
Major conceptual contributions of a number of Nobel-laureates in putting forth a framework 
linking the citizenry's right to know and access to information with development, have already 
had a major influence in various fields. However, implementation of transparency-related reforms 
on the ground remains checkered around the globe. Further, in contrast with other dimensions of 
governance -such as rule of law and regulatory burden-, there is a gap between the extent of the 
conceptual contributions in the transparency field and the progress on its measurement and 
empirical analysis, which has been wanting. Our paper is a contribution attempting to partly fill 
these empirical and policy-related gaps.  
  
We contribute to empirics by undertaking an initial construction of a transparency index for 194 
countries based on over twenty 20 independent sources. An Unobserved Component Model 
(UCM) was used to generate the country ratings and the margins of error. The indices comprise 
an aggregate transparency index with two sub-components: economic/institutional transparency, 
and political transparency. The results emphasize variance. Exemplary transparency is not the 
exclusive domain of a particular region, and there are transparency-related challenges in countries 
in each region and income categories. Further, there is significant within-country variation, with 
large differences in performance between economic/institutional and political dimensions of 
transparency. Mindful of the challenges in inferring causality, we also find that transparency is 
associated with better socio-economic and human development indicators, as well as with higher 
competitiveness and lower corruption. Much progress can be attained without requiring 
inordinate amount of resources, since transparency reforms can be substantial net 'savers' of 
public resources, and often can serve as a more efficient and less financially costly substitute to 
creating additional regulations and/or regulatory or governance bodies. We provide a number of 
concrete examples of specific transparency-related reforms within a strategic framework, as well 
as a brief country illustration - the case of Chile. 
                                                 
1 Preliminary draft discussion paper presented at the IMF conference on transparency and integrity, held on 
July 6th-7th, 2005.  Inputs by M. Mastruzzi, A. Kraay and R. Islam are gratefully acknowledged.   Errors 
and views are solely the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the institution or its 
Executive Directors.    
 
  2
‘Transparenting Transparency’ 
 
I. Transparency and Development:  Introduction 
 
Nobel prizes have been awarded for bringing attention to the importance of information 
in the functioning of the markets. George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz 
received the Nobel Prize in 2001 for their analysis of how imperfect information can lead 
to market failures. Why are interest rates often excessively high on local lending markets 
in developing countries? Why do people who want to buy a good used car turn to a dealer 
rather than a private seller? Why does a firm pay dividends even if they are taxed more 
heavily than capital gains? For more than two decades, the theory of markets with 
asymmetric information has been a lively field of economic research. Countless 
applications extend from traditional agricultural markets in developing countries to 
modern financial markets in developed economies.  
 
In democratic societies, access to information and transparency can also be considered as 
a human right. As Stiglitz (1999) points out, there is a basic right to know, to be informed 
about what the government is doing and why. In principal-agent situations, citizens have 
the right to know about their agent’s behavior, especially when the agents are 
governments or international organizations and the principals are the general public. 
However, beyond the human rights and the market efficiency arguments, transparency is 
also critical for human development because it provides incentives for redistribution and 
inclusiveness. Amartya Sen won the 1998 Nobel Prize for illustrating the role of 
information and “entitlement” in the functioning of the markets. His extensive research 
on famines in the great Bengal, Sahel, Bangladesh and Ethiopia showed that famines had 
occurred in years when the supply of food was not significantly lower than during 
previous years. The problem was not the shortage of food but lack of information and 
“voice”. People will starve when their entitlement is not sufficient to buy the food 
necessary to keep them alive.   
 
This political economy argument reveals the potential of information for human 
development. Transparency is important not only because it increases the efficiency in 
the allocation of resources, but also because it may help in ensuring that the benefits of 
growth are redistributed and not captured by the elite. As in any other institutional 
reform, the challenge to bringing about transparency and accountability lies in incentives. 
Even if transparency brings out a more efficient allocation of resources and more 
responsive institutions, why governments would implement such a reform? If politicians 
know that they are subject to public scrutiny and that their successes will be rewarded 
with public support, they will have incentives to include other constituencies in their 
political agendas and ensure the majority of the population’s needs are met. This social 
contract between the state and its citizens by which citizens grant power to the executive 
and demand accountability in return lies at the core of the development process. Yet in 
countries where state capture or predatory leadership remains a challenge, transparency 
reforms are likely to be resisted by certain groups in society and within the institutions 
themselves. In these cases, entry points for reform would lie in civil society and in 
building new alliances with the potential beneficiaries of disclosure.    
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The towering conceptual contributions of the Nobel-laureates in putting forth a 
framework linking the citizenry’s right to know and to access to information with 
development are undisputable, and have already had a significant influence in various 
fields.  However, actual implementation of transparency-related reforms on the ground, 
while not devoid of stellar examples and progress in some countries, remains checkered 
globally.  Further, there has been a significant gap between the extent of the theoretical 
(such as asymmetric information) and conceptual contributions in this area, on the one 
hand, and the progress on measurement and empirics in the field of transparency.  This is 
in contrast with other dimensions of governance, such as corruption, rule of law, and 
regulatory framework, where a plethora of indices exist, which have spun a significant 
empirical literature in these areas.  Further, related to these twin gaps in the empirical and 
policy reform areas, there has been a paucity of writings on transparency which 
decompose (or ‘unbundle’) this generic theme into specific components more amenable 
to policy intervention.   
 
Our paper is a contribution attempting to partly fill these inter-related empirical and 
policy-related gaps.  In order to do so, we review the existing literature, present various 
definitions of transparency, provide an initial empirical framework towards worldwide 
indicators on various dimensions of transparency, suggest some initial empirical results, 
and address concrete policy and institutional innovations related to transparency reforms.   
The first part of the paper presents different definitions of transparency followed by a 
brief review of the literature. Most of the literature has focused on the role of 
transparency in preventing financial crises and in monetary policy-making and it is only 
recently that more attention has been paid to information asymmetries in political markets 
and the role transparency can play in improving efficiency in the provision of public 
services. We then review another phenomenon that has received insufficient attention –
yet which has the potential of changing the way citizens relate to their governments-, 
namely the worldwide spread of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. Twenty years ago 
only ten OECD nations had laws which specifically guaranteed the rights of citizens to 
access information from public institutions. Today, over fifty countries have adopted 
comprehensive FOI laws and over thirty have pending efforts all over the world.  
  
We then turn to the initial construction of an aggregate transparency index for 194 
countries based on more than 20 independent sources, which comprises the aggregate 
transparency index and its two sub-components: economic/institutional transparency and 
political transparency. After a brief description of the methodology, the results of the 
regression analysis are presented. The last section, before concluding, reviews concrete 
policy issues in implementing transparency reforms, and provides in brief as an 
illustration the case study of Chile.   
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II. Definitions of transparency 
 
There is no commonly agreed definition of transparency. Some definitions used by 
international organizations focus on ensuring public access to information For instance, 
the World Trade Organization states that ensuring “transparency” in international 
commercial treaties typically involves three core requirements: (i) to make information 
on relevant laws, regulations and other policies publicly available, (ii) to notify interested 
parties of relevant laws and regulations and changes to them; and (iii) to ensure that laws 
and regulations are administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.  
 
In the same vein, the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) states that to 
ensure transparency “each contracting Party shall promptly publish or otherwise make 
publicly available its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rules and judicial 
decisions of general application as well as international agreements which may affect the 
operation of the Agreement”. The OECD (2002) describes a transparent business 
environment as one in which economic agents possess essential information about the 
environment in which they operate and that search cost and information asymmetries do 
not place an undue burden on them. 
 
Reference not only to the amount of information but also the scope, accuracy and 
timeliness of such information is made in Vishwanath and Kaufmann (1999) and 
Kaufmann (2002) where transparency is defined as the “increased flow of timely and 
reliable economic, social and political information, which is accessible to all relevant 
stakeholders”. The information provided should also be accessible, relevant, of good 
quality and reliable.  Similarly, but focusing specifically on economic transparency, Islam 
(2004) bases her transparency index on the timely availability of economic data, whereas 
the Open Budget Project defines budget transparency as public access to budget 
information, including publication of budget reports and efforts to facilitate public 
disclosure and understanding of the budget.  
 
This emphasis on ensuring effective communication and understanding from the public is 
shared by other documents such as the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Guidelines. For this 
institution, monetary and financial policy transparency is the “environment in which the 
objectives of the policy, its legal, institutional and economic framework, policy decisions 
and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and financial policies and 
the accountability of the policymaking body are provided to the public in an 
understandable, accessible and timely basis”. The OECD (2002) also embraces a broader 
view that considers transparency as the result of a two-way communication between 
governments and other interested parties.  
 
Underlying these definitions we always find the idea that transparency is closely related 
to accountability. The purpose for demanding transparency is to allow citizens, markets 
or governments to hold institutions accountable for their policies and performance. This 
notion of enhancing accountability is highlighted in Florini (1999) where transparency is 
seen as “the release of information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those 
institutions”. Because transparency is a tool to facilitate the evaluation of public 
institutions, the information provided needs to account for their performance. At the same 
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time, the public must be able to interrogate the information provided and use it to hold 
institutions accountable. According to the Transparency Task Force at Brookings 
University, transparency can be regarded as the openness of institutions, that is, the 
degree to which outsiders (such as citizens or stockholders) can monitor and evaluate the 
actions of insiders (such as government officials or corporate managers). 
 
Thus, transparency can be a powerful tool to build trust in institutions among citizens. In 
the course of legitimizing the emerging EU polity, transparency was considered as the 
principle capable of bringing about a more democratic policy-making (Moser, 2001). 
Opening up the legislative and executive procedures was seen as essential to building 
trust among citizens and counter the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the newly created 
European institutions.  
 
Yet, it is important to differentiate transparency from another phenomenon very often is 
associated with- that is, corruption. The most common definition of corruption is the “use 
of public office for private gain”; whether the provision of information is related to 
higher or lower degree of corruption and under which circumstances transparency can be 
an effective tool in reducing it is still subject to debate in the literature as we will see in 
the next section. 
  
 
III. Review of the literature 
 
The importance of information flows for the functioning of the markets has been well 
documented in the literature (Stigler, 1961; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 among others). 
Improvements in information can reduce the magnitude and consequences of principal-
agent problems2 leading to more efficiency in the allocation of resources not only in 
economic and financial markets but also in political markets. This section reviews briefly 
the existing literature on transparency and its potential impact.  
Transparency and economic and financial markets 
Most of the academic literature on transparency and accountability has focused on the 
role of transparency in preventing financial crises and in monetary policy-making. Partly 
this relatively recent interest on transparency reflects concern for the inherent volatility of 
global financial markets and the recent trend towards greater central bank independence 
in a large number of countries.  
 
Over the past decade we have witnessed financial crises in emerging economies across 
the globe –Mexico (1995), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998) and Turkey 
                                                 
2 A principal-agent problem arises when a work is delegated: one person, the principal, hires an agent to 
perform tasks on his behalf but he cannot ensure that the agent performs them in precisely the way the 
principal would like. The decisions and the performance of the agent are impossible and or expensive to 
monitor and the incentives of the agent may differ from those of the principal. Examples of principal-agent 
situations can be found in the corporate world, where the principal are the shareholders and the agent the 
managers of the firm, within the firm, where the principal are the managers and the agent the employees or 
in the political system where the principal are the citizens and the agent is the government.  
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(2001)- characterized by weaknesses in the domestic financial sector. As highlighted by 
Rahman (1998) accounting and disclosure played a key role in the East Asian crises. 
Most of the corporations and banks in the five East Asian countries did not follow 
international accounting standards in reporting those financial transactions that appear to 
have been responsible for triggering the financial crisis. Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) 
also illustrate how poor transparency combined with new and deregulated financial 
markets may lead to unsustainable investment and large exposures and vulnerability of 
financial institutions. Based on empirical evidence from a dataset of 56 countries from 
1977 to 1997 the study shows that an increase in transparency of fiscal and monetary 
policy or macro economic data decreases the probability that financial liberalization 
would lead to a crisis. Furthermore, lack of accountability of the executive3 and lack of 
independence of the Central Bank were pointed out by the Economist (1998) as one of 
the causes of the “tequila” crisis.   
 
Among the range of proposals to avoid similar crises in the future, consensus has 
emerged on the global strategy to increase transparency of domestic financial sectors. 
There have been numerous efforts by the international community to set up standards for 
financial transparency including: 
- IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies 4    
- Accounting standards for the public sector set by the International Federation of 
Accountants and auditing standards set by the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions.  
- transparency principles for international banking established by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision  
- OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency 
- OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
- APEC transparency standards in Trade and Investment Liberalization and 
Facilitation. 
- OECD Anti-bribery Convention, 1996 Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption, the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption and the 2003 African 
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
- Other international agreements currently under discussion with reference to 
transparency standards are the WTO Agreement on Procurement, the Charter for 
Transparency on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
 
                                                 
3 In particular, reference is made to the lack of accountability of the presidency. In the article a cabinet 
member is quoted saying: “If there had been any real checks on the executive in 1994, we simply would not 
have been able to issue nearly $30 billion of dollar-denominated debt behind Congress’s back.” 
4 The Fund carries out reports on the observance of this Standards and Codes (ROSCs) on a periodical basis 
at the request of the member countries. ROSCs were developed to provide an assessment of institutional 
issues following the emerging market crises of the 1990s. They assess members against internationally 
accepted standards of good practice in 11 (recently updated to 12) areas covering three broad issues: 
transparency, financial market regulation and corporate governance. The production and publication of 
ROSCs is voluntary for all members and the reports explicitly avoid providing a rate.  
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In this context it is widely argued that transparency reduces market uncertainty about 
policy-makers’ preferences, resulting in more predictable monetary policy and more 
efficient financial markets. Distortions in information within financial markets are crucial 
in explaining the large influx of foreign capital into emerging markets as well as its rapid 
departure in times of crisis. Lack of transparency in policy decision-making and 
unsystematic disclosure of information relevant for the formation of rational expectations 
obliges private agents to review their expectations raising the variability of asset prices, 
consumption and investment, increasing the risk of investments. The latter translates into 
higher risk-premiums demanded on investments, which in turn increases the rate of 
interest. Public disclosure of information can therefore mitigate market inefficiencies 
created by adverse selection and moral hazard providing easier access to capital markets 
and better terms for government financing. 
 
Transparency is also an important component of good governance on its own right 
reinforcing the independence, accountability and integrity of financial sector regulators. 
In general, inflation-targeting central banks are believed to be both highly transparent and 
accountable (see for example, Faust and Svensson, 1999; Blinder, 2000; Hallett and 
Viegi, 2001). Fracasso et al. (2003) evaluate inflation reports provided by 19 inflation-
targeting central banks in terms of quantity, frequency and quality of the information and 
conclude that decisions taken by central banks that achieve consistently high ratings are 
more predictable that those with less appreciated reports. Disclosure of information also 
facilitates accountability, and where potential policy conflicts arise among government 
agencies, it encourages policy consistency. Rather than whether transparency is desirable 
or not, the debate has shifted to how financial institutions can achieve better transparency 
(Winkler, 2000; Camilleri, 2005). 
 
Countries with more transparent policy environments tend to perform better in 
international financial markets (OECD, 2003; Erbaş, 2004). Using a micro dataset on 
international portfolio holdings, Gelos and Wei (2002) examine the impact of country 
transparency during the period 1996-2000. The study distinguishes between government 
and corporate transparency. For governments, it considers macroeconomic data 
availability (timeliness and frequency) and transparency in the conduct of 
macroeconomic policies5, whereas corporate transparency refers to availability of 
financial and other business information about firms in a country. The study finds clear 
evidence that international funds invest systematically less in less transparent countries. 
Government opacity and corporate opacity have separate, depressing effects on 
investment 
                                                 
5 The study uses a data set on investment positions by individual international funds in various countries 
from eMergingPortfolio.com (formerly Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.). To measure transparency 
and predictability of a government’s macroeconomic policies, an index measure of macro policy opacity is 
constructed based on Oxford Analytica scores. For about half of the countries, Oxford Analytica relied 
heavily on the ROSCs produced by the IMF. The frequency and timeliness of government information 
release, is based on the indices developed by the IMF on the frequency and timeliness of national 
authorities’ macroeconomic data dissemination. The variable Corporate Transparency is based on the level 
of financial disclosure and availability of information reported in the survey carried out for the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. 
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For example, a country like Venezuela could increase by 300 percent its international 
portfolio investment if it increased its transparency to Singapore's level.  They also find 
moderate evidence that lack of transparency makes investors more likely to engage in 
herding behavior; that is, when dealing with less transparent countries, investment 
decisions are more likely to be determined by what other fund managers are doing as 
opposed to a rational, independent assessment of market fundamentals. During 
economic crises, fund managers "flee non-transparent countries and invest in more 
transparent ones."  
The adverse effect of opacity on the cost and availability of capital in 35 countries is 
assessed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002). Their Opacity Index suggests that Russia 
may has been losing up to $10 billion a year in potential foreign investments because of 
corruption, inadequate accounting procedures, weaknesses in its legal system and lack of 
reliable financial information. Calculating the risk premium imposed by opacity as the 
increased cost of borrowing faced by countries due to lack of information in areas that 
affect capital markets, the study concludes that countries like Russia and China, with a 
risk premium of 1,225 and 1,316 basis points in 2000 had to pay international investors 
an extra 12% or 13% of their sovereign debt due to lack of transparency. 6 Corruption has 
also been found to affect negatively investment flows. Based on data on investment flows 
from the early 1990s, Wei (1997) illustrates how corruption reduces the host countries’ 
ability to attract foreign investment. If a country like the Philippines could reduce its 
corruption level to the level of Singapore, other things being equal, it would have been 
able to raise its investment/GDP ration by 6.6 per cent. Wei (1998) suggests that China’s 
underachievement in attracting FDI based on its size, proximity to some major source 
countries and other factors might be related to this.   
 
The message that emerges from the literature is clear, investors tend to stay away from 
countries with high corruption levels and lack of reliable information. Nevertheless, 
regression analysis does not aboard the issue of causality and it is difficult to disentangle 
what is driving what. For example, it is not evident whether countries become more 
transparent when they become rich, or whether being more transparent helps them to 
become rich. Because many countries that are transparent have usually implemented 
other good policies, it is also difficult to separate the effect of transparency from the 
effect of these policies. Glennerster and Shin (2003) use a number of techniques to 
separate out the effect of transparency from these other factors and they found that 
countries that adopted transparency reforms7, introduced and encouraged by the IMF 
                                                 
6 Opacity is defined in the PWC report as “the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely 
accepted practices” and the composite O-Factor is calculated by averaging (on an equally weighted basis) 
the various components of opacity for each country: corruption, legal system, government macroeconomic 
and fiscal policies, accounting standards and practices (including corporate governance and information 
release), and regulatory regime. The index was based on a survey carried out in 2000 among a pool of 
experts in each country. Unfortunately, against the initial intention, the index has not been published again. 
7 Using data for 23 emerging market economies during 1999-2002, the paper assesses the effect of three 
reforms introduced on a voluntary basis by the IMF designed to increase the flow of information to the 
public and markets. They are: the publication of IMF country documents and, in particular, Article IV 
reports, which evaluate the macroeconomic performance of all member countries, the production and 
publication of ROSCs, which assess members’ institutions and the creation of the Special Data 
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after the 1997–98 Asian crisis, saw substantial reductions in their spreads relative to those 
that did not adopt the reforms. Greater transparency not only reduced the borrowing costs 
for those countries who adopted the reforms but also encouraged them to follow better 
policies (for example, publishing accurate reserves figures is likely to encourage 
countries to hold higher levels of reserves). The study found no evidence that countries 
published only when they had good news to share.  
The results of Glennerster and Shin (2003) suggest that markets are prepared to reward -
or penalize less- countries for revealing the details of their policies even when  the news 
are not good, partly because they think that countries that are honest about any failings 
are more likely to fix them. Markets tend to penalize the country in particular when they 
see that it is not transparent. The news may not always be good, but, on average, 
countries that are more open will have significantly lower borrowing costs. Similarly, 
Gelos and Wei (2002) observed that in transparent countries, fund managers are willing 
to wait for further confirmation before engaging in a costly reallocation of assets, 
whereas lack of transparency seems to make investors somewhat suspicious of 
economic news.  
In the corporate world, information also contributes to overcome the principal-agent 
problem. Firm managers are supposed to be agents of the owners, who hold stock, but 
shareholders and investors have only imperfect information to determine whether the 
company is being well-managed and whether they should invest in it. Transparency and 
disclosure mitigate the information asymmetry and have been long recognized as an 
integral part of corporate governance. Patel, Balic and Bwakira (2002) found that firms 
with higher transparency and disclosure are valued higher than comparable firms with 
lower transparency and disclosure, consistent with the notion that market places a 
premium on companies with lower asymmetric information problem. Furthermore, recent 
accounting scandals like Enron, Tyco or WorldCom among others, have forced countries 
to approve stricter financial disclosure requirements for companies listed in stock 
markets. 
 
But as Williams (2001) argues, for companies that have come under the spotlight, simply 
meeting the legal requirements to regularly report financial (and sometimes 
environmental) information to shareholders and regulators is no longer enough, they need 
to go further in transparency. Today, transparency issues affect every relationship firms 
depend on for success: employees, global networks of business partners and suppliers, 
consumers and NGOs, investors. With demands for transparency originating from all 
sides and for all imaginable issues, transparency has become an essential component of a 
corporate strategy beyond the risk management approach. The strategic value of greater 
transparency is to build trust among stakeholders.  Companies can only build stakeholder 
relationships based on trust if they are proactive about transparency, or in other words, if 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dissemination Standards (SDDS) which sets common definitions for macroeconomic data, minimum 
frequency and timeliness standards. Three quarterly measures of transparency where constructed based on 
whether a country has published an Article IV report or ROSC and met the specifications of the SDDS. An 
indicator of lack of transparency was also constructed which measures a country’s decision not to take the 
opportunity to publish and Article IV report.  
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they anticipate and deliberately disclose the information stakeholders seek in order to 
provide reassurance that the firm is trustworthy. 
  
Transparency and governance 
 
Transparency has also received attention as another dimension of governance. In this 
field, a consensus seems to have emerged that poor governance have substantial, adverse 
effects on economic growth and development indicators. Economist and policy makers 
have long recognized that institutions matter in determining economic performance 
(Rodrik and Subramarian, 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002; Knack and 
Keefer 1995, La Porta et al., 1998; Olson, 1965; Rigobon and Rodrik 2004, Edison, 2003, 
Kaufmann and Kraay 2002, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005; Williamson, 2000) 
and the modern economic literature on rent seeking has analyzed thoroughly the 
relationship between trade distortions, rent seeking behavior and economic inefficiencies 
(Krueger, 1974; North, 1990, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).  
 
Moreover, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) examine the causal relationship between 
governance and growth. Their results show a strong positive casual effect running from 
better governance to higher per capita income and the absence of a "virtuous circle" in 
which higher incomes lead to further improvements in governance. Improvements in 
institutional quality or governance are unlikely to occur merely as a consequence of 
economic development. Quite the opposite, as countries become richer, influential elites 
can resist demands for improvement in governance as evidence on state capture in some 
Latin American countries reveals. 
 
But what is the relationship between transparency and governance?. In one of the few 
studies on the issue, Islam (2003) explores how information flows improve governance 
and institutional quality in 169 countries. Her regression analysis shows that countries 
which provide better economic information in terms of quantity and quality also govern 
better for a wide number of governance indicators such as government effectiveness, 
regulatory burden, control of corruption, voice and accountability, the rule of law, 
bureaucratic efficiency (from Kaufmann and Kraay) and contract repudiation and 
expropriation risk8.   
 
Another study that explores the relationship between transparency and governance is 
Chan-Lee and Sanghoon (2001) which presents estimates about the “informational 
quality” of financial systems for 34 emerging market economies (EMEs)  (13 of which 
are in Asia) and 21 OECD countries for 1995-19989. Informational quality is defined as 
                                                 
8 Controlling for regional dummies (such as Africa, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia, South Asia or 
Eastern Europe) or adding years since independence as an additional variable does not alter the main 
conclusion: transparency is significantly correlated with governance indicators. Even in countries where 
much of the information packaging and dissemination to the general public is controlled by government, a 
government that publishes more economic information governs better on average. The transparency index 
was found to be significant even after controlling for newspaper circulation, freedom of the press and the 
presence of a Freedom Information Law.        
9 27 microeconomic-cum-institutional indicators are grouped under three categories: institutional-
governance environment, the regulatory environment-structural strength of banking systems, and the 
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the capacity of the institutional governance environment (and the incentive structures it 
engenders) to generate information base on which financial systems and economic 
development depend. The results suggests that the institutional-governance environment 
is by far the dominant factor determining global informational quality, while the 
regulatory environment and structural strength of banks, followed by capital markets are 
the next two most important variables. Income levels are also significant but along with 
“political obstacles” are at the bottom of the list. 
 
Although, corruption and lack of transparency are treated in some studies as two sides of 
the same coin10, it should be noted that the relationship between both phenomena is far 
from been thoroughly explored. In one of the few studies on the issue, Mauro (2004) 
builds a general equilibrium model in which “bad equilibrium” is characterized by 
pervasive corruption and low investment and growth. An important policy implications of 
this model is that policies aimed at improving transparency and, more generally, 
disseminating information help in controlling corruption and fostering economic growth. 
However, without outside intervention, governments might be unable to break the vicious 
circles their countries seem to be stuck in. 
 
Evidence from micro studies such as Reinikka and Svensson (2003) shows the 
importance of public access to information in reducing corruption   In the late 1990s, the 
Ugandan government initiated a newspaper campaign to boost schools’ and parents’ 
ability to monitor officials’ handling of a large school-grant program and reduce 
corruption11. The results of the campaign were striking: capture was reduced from 80 per 
cent in 1995 to less than 20 per cent in 2001. The provision of information empowered 
citizens to demand certain standards and monitor and challenge abuses by public 
officials. The more exposed were teachers and the community to the information 
campaign, the greater the reduction in the capture.  In the same vein, Yang (2005a) shows 
how preshipment inspection of imports (PSI) programs can contribute to combat 
corruption in customs agencies by providing an independent source of information and 
reduce the information asymmetry that can be exploited by the importer.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
functional quality of capital markets. These estimates are circa 1995-1998, although preliminary estimates 
are also presented for 1985. The “global informational quality” index is a weighted average, in which the 
first two categories receive twice the weight of the capital market.   
10 For example, Drabek and Payne (2002) take the Transparency index of the Country Risk Guide 
published monthly by Political Risk Services (PRS) to assess the impact of transparency on FDI. The index 
is constructed as an aggregate of level of corruption, law and order, bureaucratic quality, contract viability 
and the risk of expropriation.    
11  Reinikka and Svensson (2003) evaluate the impact of the campaign using distance to the nearest 
newspaper outlet as an instrument for exposure of the community and the teachers to the information 
campaign. They find a strong correlation between proximity to a newspaper store and reduction in the 
capture since the newspaper campaign started, which represents a significant change in pattern from the 
five-year period preceding the campaign. Instrumenting for head teachers’ knowledge about the grant 
program, they find that public access to information is a powerful deterring to capture of funds at the local 
level.   
 
 
  12
However, transparency may also its downside when it is only partially applied. Although 
corruption is more likely to be detected in a more transparent organization, as inevitable 
side effect, potential corruptors receive better information about the identities of key 
decision-makers; thereby enhance incentives to establish “connections” for corruption. 
Mehmet (2001) presents a theoretical model with explicit links between transparency, 
incentives to build connections and the use of connections for corruption. If this 
“connections effect” is important and dominates the effect on the detection probability, 
corruption may actually increase when the organization becomes (locally) more 
transparent. For sufficiently large improvements in transparency the detection effect 
dominates the connections effect and then more transparency reduces corruption.  
 
Although this hypothesis that transparency can actually increase corruption has not been 
supported by the evidence thus far, the conclusion reached by some micro-studies does 
require caution in this regard. Thus, evidence provided by Yan (2005b) on custom reform 
in the Philippines and Wykes (2005) on managing oil revenues in Congo Brazzaville 
seem to confirm that when partially applied, transparency can lead to a switch to 
alternative methods of corruption without having any significant impact on the overall 
amount of funds diverted.    
 
 
Transparency and political markets 
 
Despite of being of critical importance, not much attention has been given in the 
literature to the importance of transparency in the political arena which contracts with the 
attention it has received in the economic/financial area. In political markets, as in any 
other market, imperfection of information gives rise to agency problems between those 
governing and those that they are supposed to serve. Transparency and information flows 
have therefore an important role to play in ensuring that politicians get the right 
incentives to serve to the majority of the population.  
 
Ferejohn (1986), Persson and Tabellinin (2001), and Blumkin and Gradstein (2002) apply 
the principal-agency framework to policy decision making whereby the ruling 
government is viewed as an agent whose actions are only imperfectly monitored by the 
public. Blumkin and Gradstein (2002) find that the ruling government tends to be more 
corrupt the less transparent is the decision making process. Lack of transparency 
magnifies the moral hazard problem in the interaction between the electorate and the 
ruler, making the control of the later more difficult. The more open and democratic is the 
political system, the lower the degree of corruption.  
 
But transparency is not only important to improve governance. The policy process is a 
continuum process where influences from a range of interest groups are received at each 
stage from agenda setting, to the identification of alternatives, weighting up the options, 
choosing the most favorable and implementing it. Thus, transparency and dissemination 
of information at each stage is critical to allow different social groups to participate in the 
decision-making process. The broader the dissemination the better the allocation of 
resources will meet the needs of the majority of the population. Three political market 
imperfections are highlighted by Keefer and Khemani (2005) as particularly important 
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for understanding government incentives to serve the poor: lack of information among 
voters about the performance of politicians, social fragmentation among voters and lack 
of credibility of political promises to citizens.  
 
These imperfections help in explaining why political competition fails to induce the 
optimal provision on public goods.. Keefer and Khemani (2005) point out to the 
difficulties citizens have in evaluate the quality and efficiency of public services and 
determining who is responsible for them as an explanation for pervasive failures of 
service provision. Thus, information constraints reduce the ability of citizens to hold 
politicians accountable and encourage politicians to cater to special interest, distorting 
incentives to provide social services to poor people. As shown by Brinkerhoff and Keener 
(2003) local communities in Madagascar who were better informed and able to hold 
district authorities accountable, were able to demand better services and that the budget 
was allocated according to community priorities. Similarly, Reinikka and Svensson 
(2004) found that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government, 
Ugandan schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding. Schools 
in better-off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements. The 
provision of information can therefore be a powerful tool in increasing the bargaining 
power of disadvantage schools.   
 
The media can play a key role in increasing government accountability to the general 
public. It can also be crucial in increasing the political leverage of certain groups, 
empowering rural and remote communities. Strömberg (2002) illustrates how between 
1933 and 1935 the United States federal assistance to low-income households was greater 
in counties where more households had radios and thus were better informed about 
government policies and programs.  For every percentage point increase in the share of 
households with radios in a certain county, the governor would increase per capita relief 
spending by 0.6 per cent. Politicians also allocated fewer relief funds to areas with large 
share of illiterate people. The radio also improved the relative ability of rural America to 
attract government transfers. In total, radio increased the funds allocated to a rural county 
relative to an identical urban county by an estimated 20 percent. Similarly, preliminary 
results also indicate that African-Americans and people with little education gained from 
the introduction of television in the 1950s.  
 
In the same vein, Besley, Burgess and Prat (2003) conclude that higher penetration of the 
media promotes greater responsiveness by public agents. Their study on media access in 
different states in India shows how government allocations of relief spending and public 
food distribution during natural disasters were greater in states with higher newspaper 
circulation. Greater local presence of the media allowed citizens to develop a collective 
voice and the effect was greater for newspapers in local languages. However, as pointed 
out by Glennerster (2005) more evidence is needed not only on the role of information in 
service provision but also on the existence of mechanisms of voice and participation that 
empower communities to act on that information and initiate reform.  
 
The importance of the demand in the provision of information is highlighted in Allum 
and Agça (2001) study on economic data dissemination practices of 180 countries. From 
the explanatory variables considered, country size was found to have a major influence 
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on data dissemination, with larger countries having stronger dissemination records due to 
higher demand. On the contrary, countries with small populations and therefore lower 
demand for information disseminate data on a less frequent and timely basis, although 
cost and capacity considerations are likely to be important. The data suggest that 
sociopolitical variables have also a strong influence on the dissemination of economic 
data. In particular, variables such as adult literacy and political participation seem to 
influence the amount of information provided by public institutions.  This is also true for 
external demand for information: relatively open countries or countries active in 
international capital markets present stronger dissemination records. 
 
 
IV. Freedom of Information (FOI) Laws: Necessary but Insufficient? 
 
As we have seen the potential benefits of transparency are many. It can improve 
investment climate and performance in financial markets. It can also reinforce the 
independence and integrity of financial institutions, promotes the public debate and 
facilitates early identification of the weaknesses and strengths of policies. Rightly 
implemented, it can provide an important guard against abuses, mismanagement and 
corruption. Legislatures, the media and civil society are better able to hold the executive 
to account when they have information on its policies, practices and expenditures. 
Increase transparency may also increase faith in government and commitment to policy 
trade-offs enhancing social cohesion. For instance, if the public can better understand 
what their government is doing and why, they may have more confidence in that 
government developing citizen trust in democratic institutions. But as it is argued in this 
section, the provision of information is not enough. For it to be effective, the information 
has to be selective and targeted to different social groups who should have the capacity to 
analyze it and act on it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. Access to Information Law and Citizen Monitoring- Mexico 
 
How many cows are in Mexico?, how much milk was produced in the country in 2003? or which 
parliamentarians had unjustified absences from Parliament? were some of the request for information 
answered during 2004 under the Mexican Law of Transparency and Access to the Public Governmental 
Information. The Access to Information Law was approved in Mexico as part an historical effort to broaden 
democracy and open government information to public scrutiny after the election in July 2000 of the first 
victorious presidential candidate from outside the powerful Partido Institucional Revolucionario (PRI) in more 
than seventy years. Such was the interest among the general public that 47,186 requests for public 
information were received the first 14 months after passing the law. The information is accessed through a 
user-friendly portal (www.sisi.org.mx) where all the answers are published. Mexico is the country who spends 
more in providing information to the public, 22 million dollars, followed by the United States with 20 million 
dollars and Canada with 3 million dollars.   
 
Mexico also promotes citizens monitoring of public institutions. The Guide for the Citizen Monitoring prepared 
by the Mexican Ministry of Public Administration facilitates two types of monitoring: 
1. The first one is based on the exercise of the right to the information and on the effective and efficient use 
of the Federal Law of Transparency and Access to the Governmental Public Information.  
2. The second proposes to use access to the information to monitor performance of public institutions 
including measurement and observation instruments like surveys to the users of public services; 
interviews with public servants and visits to government institutions to collate information.  
 
The Guide for the Citizen Monitoring is available in the site www.monitoreociudadano.gob.mx, where 
documentation, a capacitating workshop and a space of dialogue to share experiences can be found on 
monitoring, citizen participation and access to the public information 
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Access to government records and information is an essential requirement for enhancing 
transparency. And it is important that the right to access information is guaranteed by 
law. Even though ministers and officials may recognize the importance of transparency, 
the political and bureaucratic pressures to control information can be irresistible. Merely 
the act of adopting a law can limit certain abuses and can make people aware of their 
rights. It is also a way of signaling government’s commitment to transparency and the 
first step of institutionalize the right to access information and provide resources to it.  
 
Moreover, the law can be an important tool in building democratic attitudes and 
enhancing trust in institutions. As the case of Mexico (described in Box 1) and Thailand 
illustrate (Chogkittavorn, 2002), the law can encourage people to ask their government 
for information changing the way citizens relate to their institutions, and strengthening 
democratic values. One of the main benefits of FOI laws is that they allow citizens to 
directly interact with public institutions without depending on lawyers, journalist or 
elected representatives. Graph 1 shows how FOI laws and voice and accountability go 
hand in hand. Countries who have adopted FOI laws are the ones where citizens enjoy 
greater voice and were able to demand the adoption of such a law and vice versa, FOI 
laws could also be contributing to enhance voice and accountability within a country.  
 
 
Graph 1. FOI Law vs. Voice and Accountability, 2004   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Voice & Accountability: KK 2004; FOI: Global Survey, 2004. # of countries per x-axis category: No 
FOI (103), Processing FOI (31), FOI Adopted (60).  
 
Governments around the world are increasingly adopting FOI laws and making more 
information about their activities available. Over fifty countries have now adopted 
comprehensive Freedom of Information Acts and over thirty more have pending efforts. 
While the vast majority of countries that have adopted laws are northern, much of the rest 
of the world is also moving in the same direction.
 
In Asia, nearly a dozen countries have 
either adopted laws or are on the brink of doing so. In South and Central America and the 
Caribbean, half a dozen countries have adopted laws and nearly a dozen more are 
currently considering them. Openness is also starting to emerge in Africa. South Africa 
enacted a wide reaching law in 2001 and many countries in southern and central Africa, 
mostly members of the Commonwealth, are following its lead. For a review of existing 
FOI laws see Ackerman and Eréndira (2005b) and Banisar (2004). 
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However, the enactment of a FOI law is only the beginning. For it to be of any use, it 
must be implemented and public institutions must change their internal cultures. As the 
following examples of information obtained under FOI laws show, public institutions 
tend to resist releasing information. Perseverance of civil society is therefore crucial in 
ensuring that the law is actually implemented and effective.  Box 2 describes how the 
British and the US Government have been forced to release information on farm 
subsidies requested by the media and NGOs.  
 
Other examples shown in Box 3 illustrate how FOI laws have been used to exposed 
hidden lobbying expenditures in Japan and UK, lavish expending of Canadian officials, 
graft in Indian public service, details of the 2003 diplomatic quarrel between Mexico and 
Cuba, Human rights violations of Slovak old regime, Apartheid military dealings in 
South Africa and participation in bribery schemes of UK and Russian Oil companies. The 
FOI law was also instrumental in forcing the Scottish Education Minister to keep 
publishing performance tables in which parents rely to assess school’s academic 
achievements.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2. FOIA law discloses British and US farm subsidies 
For the first time the United Kingdom disclosed information on the amounts and recipients of EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies on March 22, 2005 thanks to a request filed by the Guardian 
newspaper under the new British Freedom of Information Act. The figures show that the Queen received 
more than £769,000 in EU farm subsidies in fiscal years 2003-04, while Prince Charles benefited from 
around £300,000 in agricultural payments to his personal estate, the Duchy of Cornwall, and the Duchy's 
Home Farm.  Critics of the subsidies have been complaining for long that they primarily benefit 
multinational corporations and the wealthiest landowners. The system has changed since the period 
covered by these figures, and payments are no longer based on the amount of land and animals farmed. 
Farmers can now produce what the market needs and are rewarded for preserving the countryside, 
although there are no limits to individual owners.  
Similar and far more detailed information on United States farm subsidies has been available since a 
lawsuit brought by the Washington Post forced the U.S. Department of Agriculture to reveal the data in 
1996. The ruling, which found the release of the information a matter of "significant public interest," 
empowered advocacy organizations to create a massive online database of farm subsidy payments from 
raw data obtained using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.  
The Environmental Working Group, an NGO based in Washington, D.C., successfully obtained under FOIA 
details of a little known government program mysteriously labeled the “upland cotton-marketing certificate 
program.” Documents reveal that the program is really a disguised farm subsidy that will cost American 
taxpayers $1.7 billion this year alone. The New York Times reported that most members of Congress it had 
contacted about the program had no knowledge of its existence. Individual textile companies received as 
much as $107 million to purchase American cotton. The program was but one component of the massive 
2002 farm bill that Congress approved.  
Source: www.freedominfo.org 
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Mendel (2004) lists the international and comparative standards that should underpin 
freedom of information legislation: 
- Principle 1. Maximum disclosure. Freedom of information legislation should be 
guided by the principle of maximum disclosure. 
Box 3. Information released under Freedom of Information Laws around the world. 
1. CANADIAN OFFICIALS’ LAVISH SPENDING EXPOSED. Information released under a Canadian access to 
information statute revealed outrageous travel costs incurred by the Premier of Alberta and his entourage. The 
information disclosed included evidence of orange juice costing $27 a glass, a four day rental of a van and a truck 
totaling $8,000, and a $2,600 lunch tab for 12 people in Mexico.   
2. HIDDEN LOBBYING EXPENDITURES REVEALED IN JAPAN. In an official 2002 company report, the All 
Japan Liquor Merchants Association covered up the amount it spent on lobbying efforts. According to documents 
obtained from the Public Management Ministry by The Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper under Japan’s Freedom of 
Information Law, some ¥26.5 million the Association reported as political campaign contributions actually went to 
lobbying efforts which coincided with the repeal of national licensing requirements for liquor merchants, and 
involved cash payments to lawmakers.  
3. INDIAN CITIZEN INVOKES RIGHT TO KNOW AND EXPOSES GRAFT. In the Indian state of Maharashtra, 
one man took on his city government when he used a local FOI statute to expose a widespread pattern of abuse 
by elected officials and civil servants who used government cars for personal use, including visits to tourist resorts 
and religious pilgrimages.  
4. MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ORDERED TO DISCLOSE DETAILS OF 2003 DIPLOMATIC QUARREL WITH 
CUBA. Mexico’s Federal Institute of Access to Information (IAFI) ordered the Ministry of the Interior to release 
documents detailing events from 2003 that almost resulted in the severing of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.    
5. SLOVAK ORGANIZATION REVEALS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF OLD REGIME. The Institute on 
National Memory, a state-funded organization in Slovakia established to provide the public with access to files 
gathered by the communist-era intelligence services, said that it had received as many as 4,000 requests by June 
of 2004. The files offer a vast picture of information gathered on citizens, agents employed by the regime and 
collaborators. 
6. JOINT NGO EFFORTS REVEAL APARTHEID MILITARY DEALINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA. Working together, 
the Swiss National Science Foundation Project and South African History Archive, under threat of lawsuit, 
compelled the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (AMRSCOR) to disclose documents revealing extensive 
dealings between the Swiss weapons industry and the Apartheid era government. For months AMRSCOR had 
refused to release the documents that the NGOs were entitled to under South Africa’s freedom of information 
statute -- the Promotion of Access to Information Act. 
7. SECRET MEETINGS DISCLOSED IN BRITAIN. Repeated requests by the Guardian for information confirming 
the existence of secret meetings between Prime Minister Tony Blair and a big Labor Party political donor appear 
to have finally paid off. The controversy goes back about two years, when Blair had a series of breakfast 
meetings with Paul Drayson, a vaccine multimillionaire. Within weeks of the meetings Drayson’s company was 
awarded a lucrative government vaccine contract, without any formal bidding.  
8. PUBLIC HAS RIGHT TO SEE SLOVAK PRIVATIZATION CONTRACTS. The Slovak Justice Minister has 
ordered that details of Slovakia’s most recent round of privatization of state owned industries be disclosed. At 
issue are incentives promised by the Slovak Government to foreign corporations who increase their investments 
over time. The decision will have serious implications for the details of other high profile privatizations in Slovakia, 
including the telephone giant Slovak Telecom.  
9. BRITISH AND RUSSIAN OIL COMPANIES EMBARRASSED BY DISCLOSURE. Oil giant British Petroleum 
(BP) may wish it never merged with Russian oil company TNK. According to CIA documents released in late 2003 
under America’s Freedom of Information Act, the then-head of TNK, Simon Kukes (now CEO of Russian 
Petroleum giant YUKOS), is said to have regularly participated in bribery schemes.  
Source: www.freedominfo.org
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- Principle 2.Obligation to publish. Public bodies should be under an obligation to 
publish key information. 
- Principle 3. Promotion of Open Government. Public bodies must actively promote 
open government. 
- Principle 4. Limited Scope of Exceptions. Exceptions should be clearly and narrowly 
drawn and subject to strict “harm” and “public interest” test. 
- Principle 5. Process to Facilitate Access. Requests for information should be 
processed rapidly and fairly and an independent review of any refusal should be 
available. 
- Principle 6. Costs. Individuals should not be deterred from making requests for 
information by excessive costs. 
- Principle 7. Open Meetings. Meetings of public bodies should be open to the public. 
- Principle 8. Disclosure takes Precedence. Laws which are inconsistent with the 
principle of maximum disclosure should be amended or repealed. 
- Principle 9. Protection for Whistleblowers. Individuals who release information on 
wrongdoing must be protected.     
 
Moreover, access laws will be ineffective if citizens and non-governmental organizations 
lack the capacity to exercise their right of access or the resources to pursue complex 
requests. Similarly, access laws will not be used if elements of civil society are unable of 
recognizing the potential benefits of the disclosure of certain information or incapable of 
acting on it afterwards. There is no point in having a law that provides for the right to 
access to information if there is not clear and effective mechanism to enable citizens to 
use the law and if the content and benefits of the law have not been communicated 
through a broad communication campaign. Currie and Klaaren (2003) and Roberts (2003) 
illustrate the challenges in implementing FOI laws in the case of South Africa and 
Canada where few public and private institutions were aware of the mere existence of the 
law or the mechanism to access information. In the same vein Ackerman and Eréndira 
(2005) show examples of how top users in almost any country are the media and 
corporations in search of information which can be of private commercial interest for 
them  
 
 
Graph 2. Freedom of Information (FOI) Law vs. Extent of Information Actually Provided by 
Government to Enterprise Sector, 2004 
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As Table 1 and Graph 2 show, the mere existence of an act does not mean that access to 
information is possible or that the information provided is reliable and relevant. Countries 
who have adopted a Freedom of Information law differ a lot in the extent and quality of 
the information they provide to their citizens and the private sector.  
 
Table 1. Freedom of Information Laws and Government Transparency, 2004 
 
 NO FOI Processing FOI FOI Adopted 
Good 
Information 
from 
Government 
(EOS) 
Bahrain, China, Gambia, 
Hong Kong, Luxembourg 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius 
Morocco, Singapore 
Switzerland, Taiwan 
Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates 
Chile, Germany, 
Ghana, Namibia 
Zambia 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Japan 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, South Africa 
United Kingdom, United States 
Medium 
Information 
from 
Government 
(EOS) 
Algeria, Costa Rica 
Cyprus, Jordan 
Macedonia, Madagascar 
Malta, Vietnam 
Botswana, Brazil 
El Salvador, Indonesia 
Kenya, Malawi 
Mozambique, Nigeria 
Sri Lanka, Uganda 
Austria, Belgium Colombia, 
Estonia 
France, Greece, Israel, Jamaica 
South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, 
Philippines, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic 
Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, 
Trinidad And Tobago 
Poor 
Information 
from 
Government 
(EOS) 
Chad, Egypt 
Venezuela 
Zimbabwe 
Argentina, Bangladesh 
Bolivia, Ethiopia 
Guatemala, Honduras 
Nicaragua, Paraguay 
Russia, Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bulgaria,Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Turkey, Ukraine 
 
Source: Freedominfo (2004) and EOS (2004). 
 
Civil society groups such as press, ombudsmen and non-governmental organizations play 
a key role in the promotion and adoption of Freedom of Information Laws and in 
ensuring that the laws are effectively implemented. In Paraguay, the Parliament adopted a 
FOI law in 2001 which restricted speech and was so controversial that media and civil 
society groups successfully pressured the government to rescind it shortly after it was 
approved. In other countries, the Public Information Act was designed to restrict public 
information, not promote it. Or as in the case of Albania and Bosnia, some laws are 
adopted and never or hardly ever implemented. Independent oversight bodies are 
sometimes weakened by lack of funds which prevent timely appeals.  Excessive fees are 
often charged to prevent requests. To last, it is important that once the FOI law is 
approved, civil society keeps pressing to effectively enforce that right. Finally these 
changes towards a more transparent institutional framework should be embedded into the 
system so they are not subject to the discretion of different governments. 
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V. “Transparenting” Transparency: Towards construction of an aggregate 
transparency index. 
 
Paradoxically, in spite of much progress in constructing indices of governance and 
corruption, little if any, progress has been made in terms of broad indices of 
transparency12. This represents a first attempt to construct such an index with the 
information available on different indicators of transparency. We expect to refine the 
index as new indicators became available, hoping to represent more and more accurately 
a phenomenon with so many dimensions such as transparency.    
 
Transparency as a mechanism to promote accountability assumes both the right and the 
capacity to articulate accountability demands. It assumes the capability and willingness of 
political-economic institutions to provide information that is relevant to evaluate their 
performance and citizen’s capacity to interrogate that information and demand 
accountability. To broadly encompass this notion of transparency, we have incorporated 
both the political and the economic/institutional elements in constructing an aggregate 
transparency index. 
 
The first component we label as Economic and Institutional Transparency. It assesses the 
degree of accessibility and usefulness of the information provided by public institutions 
or, in other words, the self-imposed accountability within the state machinery. The areas 
covered by this sub-component are: economic transparency, e-government, access to 
information laws, transparency in the budget process, transparency of policy and 
transparency of the public sector. 
 
Information and communications technologies (ICT) are increasingly used in developing 
and developed countries alike to deliver public services and provide information about 
institutional performance. The relevance of the information display on official websites 
and the tools provided to enable citizens’ participation are good indicators of institutional 
transparency and accountability. In the economic/institutional component we have 
included three objective assessments of the information provided by public institutions, 
ie. Islam’s economic transparency index and the surveys on e-government carried out by 
the United Nations and Brown University’s Center for Public Policy. 
                                                 
12 To the best of our knowledge, three transparency indicators have been published to date. The first one is 
the Economic Transparency index compiled by Islam (2003) based on availability of economic data which 
has been included in our component of economic/institutional transparency. The second one is the Fiscal 
Transparency index published by Hameed (2004), based on the observance of IMF’s Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency. Unfortunately we have not been able to include this index given that the 
ROSCs are carried out on voluntary basis and in different years for each country which makes it difficult to 
establish comparisons. The third one is the “global informational quality” index developed by Chan-Lee 
and Sanghoon (2001) for 1995-1998. Again, we have not bee able to use this index given the short time-
frame. More information on these three indexes can be found in the review of literature section. 
. 
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Box 4. Impact of E-Government on improving transparency and reducing corruption. 
  
The following case studies demonstrate the potential impact of e-government applications on transparency 
and corruption. For them to be effective and sustainable, it is important that e-government applications are 
built on a sequence of objectives: increasing access to information first, ensuring that rules are transparent, 
and finally building the ability to trace decisions/actions of individual civil servants.  
 
1. Seoul Municipality, South Korea 
The OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications) system of Seoul Municipality exemplifies 
the impact on corruption of making transparent the decision-making process and the actions of individual civil 
servants. The system displays an anticorruption index (comparing five services that are most susceptible to 
corruption), educates citizens on rules and procedures, and enables real-time monitoring of progress of an 
application for a permit or license. It makes completely open and transparent those administrative practices 
that were vulnerable to corruption. 
In the first 13 months of the OPEN system, civil applications published by each city department totaled 
28,000, and the number of visits to the OPEN site reached 2 million by the end of year 2000. Results from a 
survey of 1,245 citizens showed that 84.3% believed that OPEN led to greater transparency. Other surveys 
conducted by the local chapter of Transparency International in 2000 and 2001 indicate a growing interest 
but a marginal decline in user satisfaction over time. There was little change in the perceived benefits of 
reduced time or easy access. However the percentage of respondents identifying greater transparency 
(25.1% in 2000) and prevention of corruption (9.3% in 2000) as benefits did go down over this time-period by 
3.3 and 1.4 % respectively. 
 
2. Computerization of land records, Karnataka ,India 
The Bhoomi (meaning land) project of on-line delivery of land records in Karnataka (one of the 26 states of 
India) demonstrates the benefits of making government records more open so that citizens are empowered 
to challenge arbitrary action. It also illustrates how automation can be used to take discretion away from civil 
servants at operating levels. 
The Department of Revenue in Karnataka has computerized 20 million records of land ownership of 6.7 
million farmers in the state. In the past, under the manual system, land records were maintained by 9,000 
Village Accountants, each serving a cluster of 3-4 villages. Farmers had to seek out the Village Accountant to 
get a copy of the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTC) -- a document needed for many tasks such as 
obtaining bank loans. Bhoomi has reduced the discretion of public officials by introducing provisions for 
recording a mutation request online. Farmers can now access the database and are empowered to follow up. 
 
 3. Electronic procurement in Chile 
A comprehensive e-procurement system includes three components: information and registration; e-
purchasing, and e-tendering. The Chilean system has focused on the first component of adequate public 
notification and oversight. Unlike many other countries, the Chilean system is operated by a private 
company. The e-system, entirely Internet based, was launched at www.compraschile.cl. in October 1999. A 
new Presidential Act was passed to allow e-commerce transactions, creating a new and common legislative 
framework, and replacing the DAE (Direccion de Aprovisionamiento del Estado) the main purchaser of the 
public sector with a smaller agency. The new purchasing agency supervises the system, provides technical 
assistance and, for some commodities, negotiates aggregated contracts. In the first phase, 454 suppliers (in 
75 different business areas) and 16 public agencies were registered in the e-system. By June 2001 nearly 
4000 firms were registered with the site. 
 
Even though the participation in the e-system was expected to be mandatory for all public organizations, after 
two years of operation less than 18% of public procurement is notified on the web site. This was attributed to 
weakening of political support and resistance from labor in DAE. In the absence of a systematic study, it is 
difficult to quantify the impact on corruption. Savings ranging from 7 to 20% have been reported on public 
sector procurement done through the site. 
 
Source: Administrative Corruption: How Does E-Government Help?, Professor Subhash Bhatnagar Indian 
Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India, 2003 
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As discussed in the previous section, the legalization of the right to access information is 
an important step towards more transparency in the public sector. Thus, we have included 
a variable in this sub-component of the transparency index that refers to the adoption of 
Freedom of Information laws to protect citizen’s right to access information from public 
institutions.  
 
Another important area to hold governments accountable is to monitor how they take 
decisions regarding the budget and how they spend revenues. As the primary economic 
policy document, transparency and participation in the budget are particularly important 
to assess whether governments are financially accountable. Three related-variables have 
been added to the economic/institutional sub-component: objective assessments provided 
by the International Budget Project, the Latin American index on budget transparency 
and selected questions from the OECD/WB survey on Budget Practices and Procedures. 
Other variables that have been included are indicators based on perceptions about the 
transparency of the civil service from experts of multinational institutions (such as the 
World Bank, African development Bank or Economic Commission for Africa) and the 
transparency of policy from business surveys (such as World Economic Forum and the 
Institute for Management Development).  
 
Yet, the right to hold institutions to account is meaningless without the capacity and 
resources, political and financial, to exercise that right effectively. The second sub-
component of the index shows the degree of Political Transparency and includes 
elements such as transparency of political funding, openness of the political system and 
freedom of the press to monitor government’s performance and express the people’s 
voice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5. Disclosure of political funding 
 
Unfortunately, not all countries practice the principle of open reporting political finances. At the contrary, 
less than one third of the 118 countries surveyed for the Money in Politics Handbook (USAid, 2003) have 
finance disclosure laws that require political parties to reveal their sources of campaign funds. 3 percent 
have no disclosure laws whatsoever and another 17 percent practice a kind of “hidden” disclosure whereby 
they collect some political finance information, but do not release the information to the public. 
 
Even when disclosure is mandatory, the vast majority of reporting still takes the form of aggregate 
numbers. However, without itemization of contributions or expenditures, the reports cannot be audited. 
Outside of North America, disclosure laws are most prevalent among the countries in Eastern and Western 
Europe. All nations surveyed from the former Soviet Union have disclosure laws. In Eastern Europe 
overall, 89 percent have some form of reporting campaign 
 
The transparent option: Germany 
Following the assumption that German industry was instrumental in the rise to power of Hitler and his Nazi 
party, the German constitution of 23 May 1949 (Grundgesetz) stipulated: “Parties… must account to the 
public for the sources of their funds” (article 21, section 1, clause 4). The Constitution was amended in 
1983 after a political finance scandal (the “Flick affair”), to demand further transparency and have political 
parties to “publicly account for the sources and use of their funds and for their net assets”. Reports include 
data for all levels of a party organization, federal headquarters, regional and local sections. Parties have to 
attach to their annual report a list of all donors who contributed during the year a total amount in excess of 
DEM 20,000.  These annual reports are verified by chartered accountants and presented to Parliament.  
 
Source: Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, 2003 and Money In Politics Handbook: A Guide to Increasing Transparency in Emerging 
Democracies, USAid Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003. 
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To construct the index we have used data from 18 different sources13 for 194 countries.  
The individual variables selected provide information on different dimensions of 
economic/institutional and political transparency at the country level with the intention of 
being published periodically. The sources (listed in Table 2) range from international 
organizations such as United Nations, OECD and the World Bank, political and business 
risk-rating agencies such as World Economic Forum, Institute for Management 
Development, Center for Public Integrity, Centre for Public Policy (Brown University) or 
non-government organizations such as Freedominfo, Transparency International, 
International Budget Project, Freedom House or Reporters Without Borders.  
 
Some of the variables used to construct the indicators originate from ‘objective’ measures 
of transparency; for example the existence of Freedom of Information laws (Freedom 
info) or mandatory requirements for political funding disclosure, the availability of 
information on official web sites or online tools for public participation (Global e-
government survey by the Centre for Public Policy or the UN E-government survey), or 
‘objective’ assessments against fiscal, budget and public expenditure benchmarks (i.e 
WB/OECD Budget Practices and Procedures survey or International Budget Project). 
Other individual variables rely on perception-based measures of transparency from 
enterprise surveys or polls of experts from international organizations. Both types of 
indicators have their own merits, as discussed thoroughly in Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005) and complement each other, capturing different dimensions of 
transparency. Objective assessments evaluate aspects such as the content, quality and 
frequency of the information provided by public institutions. Whereas perception-based 
data contribute to understand whether the general public is actually getting that 
information or whether the decision-making process in public institutions is clear and 
transparent. If the country adopts a Freedom of information Law but the general public, 
or even the institutions themselves, are not aware of its existence or do not know the 
mechanism to access the information, transparency cannot be considered as fully 
achieved.   
  
The sources of data also vary with respect to their coverage. A number of sources cover a 
very large sample of developed and developing countries, while others cover small 
sample of countries. Although most of these sources are representative, in the sense that 
the sample of countries they cover is representative of the world as a whole, the 
methodology used to construct the two transparency sub-components takes these 
differences in country coverage into account. Appendix 1 contains a table indicating 
which sources were treated as representative and non-representative. The data from 
individual sources were transformed into common units for aggregation across sources. 
 
                                                 
13 Detailed information on each source can be found in Appendix 2.  
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Similarly to the Governance Indicators published by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003, 2004)14, we have used an Unobserved Component Model (UCM) to aggregate the 
individual variables in each transparency sub-component. This model treats the "true" 
level of institutional transparency and political transparency in each country as 
unobserved, and assumes that each of the available sources for a country provide noisy 
"signals" of the level of transparency. The UCM then constructs a weighted average of 
the sources for each country as the best estimate of that transparency sub-component for 
that particular country. The weights are proportional to the reliability of each source. 
Therefore, the model minimizes the margins of error by automatically assigning lower 
weights to those sources that have larger noise and/or measurement errors. Technical 
details of the UCM are explained in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004, 2005). The 
resulting estimates of transparency have an expected value (across countries) of zero, and 
a standard deviation (across countries) of one. This implies that virtually all scores lie 
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to more transparency. By 
construction, the world average in each case is zero. The overall transparency index was 
constructed as a simple average of the two sub-components. 
 
When interpreting the results it is important to keep in mind the limitations of aggregated 
index such as this one. We cannot stress enough that, despite efforts to standardize data 
sources, these indicators are subject to error. Hence, small inter-temporal or inter-country 
differences should be treated with caution. Rather than establishing cross-country 
comparisons or rankings, the main objective of the transparency index is to contribute to 
the debate and offer a set of indicators so each country can monitor progress over time. 
Only country-specific diagnostics can provide enough detailed institutional information 
to form the basis for a strategy to improve transparency and accountability in the public 
sector.      
 
 
                                                 
14 The six governance indicators (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law) are available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.  
  25
Table 2. Sources of Transparency Data 
 
Dimension of transparency Variable Concept measured Source Publication Coverage 
Ec/Institutional Transparency          
  ISL 2004 Publication of economic variables WB (R. Islam)   Transparency Index 2004 worldwide 
  IBP 2004 Budget transparency International Budget Project 
Opening Budgets to 
Understanding and Debate, 2004 
developing and 
transitional countries 
  IBPL 2003 Budget transparency Fundar/International Budget Project 
Latin American Index of Budget 
Transparency 
Latino American 
countries 
  OECD 2004 Budget transparency OECD/WB 
Budget Practices and Procedures 
survey OECD countries 
  UNE 2003 E-government United Nations World Public Sector Report 2003 worldwide 
  EGOV 2004 E-government Centre for Public Policy Global E-Government 2004 worldwide 
  AGI 2004 Transparency civil service UN Economic Commission for Africa 
African Governance Indicators, 
2005 African countries 
  CPIA 2003 Transparency public sector World Bank     WB internal assessment non-OECD countries 
  
CPIAA 
2003 Transparency public sector African Development Bank ADB internal assessment African countries 
  GII 2004 Access to information  Center for Public Integrity Public Integrity Index worldwide 
  FGS 2004 Freedom of information Freedominfo Global Survey 2004 worldwide 
  EOS 2004 Communication of policy World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey worldwide 
  WCY 2004 Transparency of policy 
Institute for Management 
Development World Competitiveness Yearbook OECD countries 
Political Transparency          
  TI 2004 Political Funding Disclosure Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2004 worldwide 
  EOS 2004 Transparency in political funding World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey worldwide 
  POL 2002 Openness of political institutions Polity IV Project  
Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2002 worldwide 
  FRH 2004 Free Press Freedom House 
Freedom House (Freedom in the 
World) worldwide 
  FHT 2004 Independence of the media Freedom House 
Freedom House (nations in 
Transit) transition economies 
  HUM 2003 Freedom of speech CIRI CIRI Human Rights dataset worldwide 
  RSF 2003 Free Press Reporters Without Borders Reporters Without Borders worldwide 
  EOS 2004 Free Press World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey worldwide 
  GII 2004 Free Press Center for Public Integrity Public Integrity Index worldwide 
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VI. Transparency Matters for Economic and Human Development 
 
This section presents the results from the empirical analysis of the transparency index and 
its two sub-components: economic/institutional transparency and political transparency. 
By construction the theoretical boundary of each index goes from -2.5 to 2.5. Given that 
the indices are benchmarked to have a zero mean, the comparisons established below are 
relative to rest of world, assuming the same average world index. 
  
The level of transparency of countries across the world varies considerably with the 
overall transparency index ranging from -1.73 to 2.03.  High-income countries as a group 
have higher transparency than the rest of the economies and among them, the highest 
transparency was observed in countries such as Denmark, Australia and Netherlands. In 
the group of medium-income countries there was more variation, with the highest value 
for countries such as Chile, Estonia, Lithuania and Taiwan, confirming that transparency 
is not necessarily the domain of any geographical region or cultural background. 
Appendix 3 contains the list of countries in alphabetical order with the value of each 
index. Per regions, the EU accessed countries follow OECD countries in transparency 
levels. This is not surprising as these countries experienced significant institutional 
changes in order to meet the requirements for EU accession which placed them ahead of 
other non-advanced economies in terms of transparency. This group of countries has 
achieved similar levels of political transparency, although they still show significant 
variation in terms of institutional transparency.  
 
Table 3. Average Transparency Indices per region, 2004 
Ec/Institutional Political Overall 
 Num. Obs. Transparency Transparency Transparency 
OECD 24 1.54 1.18 1.36 
  (0.58) (0.25) (0.35) 
Non-OECD 170 -0.22 -0.17 -0.19 
  (0.70) (0.93) (0.68) 
EU accessed countries 10 0.87 0.99 0.93 
  (0.51) (0.10) (0.27) 
(excluding high income)      
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 20 -0.07 -0.58 -0.33 
   (0.56) (0.63) (0.52) 
East Asia and Pacific 22 -0.37 -0.032 -0.20 
   (0.68) (1.12) (0.66) 
Middle East & North Africa 15 -0.47 -1.15 -0.81 
  (0.39) (0.36) (0.32) 
South Asia  8 -0.12 -0.66 -0.39 
  (0.63) (0.45) (0.52) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 47 -0.64 -0.44 -0.54 
  (0.29)  (0.74) (0.48) 
Latin America  18 0.48 0.24 0.36 
   (0.72) (0.45) (0.50) 
Caribbean 14 -0.42 0.60 0.09 
   (0.45) (1.00) (0.62) 
Note that by construction the world average of each index is zero (standard deviations in brackets). 
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Latin America is the third region in terms of transparency with higher ec/institutional 
transparency than political transparency on average. In this region greater variability is 
found in the level of institutional transparency with countries like Chile on the 3rd 
position in the global ranking and countries like Honduras, on the 116 position. Political 
transparency, although lower on average levels, presents less variability. On the other 
side of the spectrum, Middle East and North Africa is the region that shows the lowest 
average transparency and the lowest political transparency. Countries such North Korea, 
Equatorial Guinea and Turkmenistan are among the least transparent countries in the 
world. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the lowest institutional transparency. 
 
It is interesting to compare the level of economic/institutional transparency versus 
political transparency.  The political transparency index is the one which shows greater 
variance ranging from -2.14 to 1.45 especially in non-OECD countries. As can be seen in 
the graph below, OECD countries show similar levels of political transparency and 
transparency in public institutions. However, this is not the case in other regions. East 
Asia and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean are regions where the 
institutional transparency is lagging behind the levels of political transparency. In most 
part of the world further advances are still to be done for the level of political 
transparency to reach the standards set in the economic/institutional arena, ie. Eastern 
Europe & Central Asia, East Asia NICs, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America, 
Former Soviet Union and South Asia.  
 
Graph 3. Economic/Institutional transparency and Political transparency, 2004 preliminary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Index ranges between -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) 
 
Whereas not many resources are needed to implement some transparency reforms, 
especially in the area of political transparency; other institutional reforms might be 
demanding in terms of human and technical resources. In order to assess the extent to 
which capacity constraints explain the level of institutional transparency in a region and 
not the lack of political will we have run a regression where Institutional Transparency is 
the dependent variable and Gross National Income per capita and Political Transparency 
the regressors. The results are shown in the table below.  For the full sample and the non-
OECD countries, political transparency and income per capita are significant at 5 per cent 
level in explaining the level of transparency of public institutions. In the group of OECD 
countries, only political transparency is significant and explains less proportion of the 
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variance. Controlling for various regional dummies (such as EU accessed countries, Latin 
America, the Caribbean, East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, Middle East & North Africa 
and Sub-Saharan Africa) does not alter these results significantly15.  
 
 
Table 5. Ec/Institutional Transparency in World Regions, 2004 
 
 All countries OECD countries non-OECD countries 
GNI per cap 0.50** -0.10 0.52** 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.08) 
Pol Transp 0.27** 0.86* 0.23** 
 (0.59) (0.54) (0.06) 
Constant 0.10 0.73 0.79 
 (0.04) (0.59) (0.5) 
# obs 165 23 142 
R2 0.57 0.30 0.34 
 
** indicates significance at .05 level and *** at .01 level. 
Source: GINI per cap: World Development Indicators, 2003. 
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, that transparency is not a 
question of resources. A lot of steps can be taken to enhance transparency in the political 
system and freedom of the press that do not require great amount of resources but serious 
commitment on the part of the government. Political transparency was highly significant 
in influencing the degree of economic/institutional transparency in both OECD and non-
OECD countries. Nevertheless, these results also highlight the role donors can play in 
those countries that have shown commitment towards transparency by undertaking some 
transparency reforms but need resources and technical assistance to be able to implement 
more challenging reforms in terms of resources such as e-government, economic or 
budget transparency. 
 
What seems clear is that transparency varies systematically with income. Countries that 
rank higher in wealth are also more transparent. The correlation between gross national 
income per capita in US dollars and the overall transparency index is 0.72, which is 
coherent with earlier studies on governance that found a positive correlation between 
institutional governance and cross-country differences in income per capita. 
 
Transparency has also an impact on the competitiveness of local businesses. A more 
transparent institutional environment can contribute to increase the rate of return of 
investments in many ways. When policies and administrative procedures that guide 
investment decisions are clear and transparent, uncertainty and business costs are lower, 
leading to more efficient investment decisions. The graph below plots the global 
competitiveness index published by the World Economic Forum for 104 countries and 
the overall transparency index. More transparent countries also seem to be more 
competitive in the global market.  
 
                                                 
15 When the regional dummies were included in the equation two of them were significant at the 5% level 
(Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean). 
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Graph 3. Overall Transparency Index and Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
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Source: GCI: World Economic Forum (2004), Overall Transparency Index, 2005 
 
Taking the establishment of a business as an example of administrative procedure, we 
find that more economic/institutional transparency is associated with lower costs to 
register a business. Graph 4 shows how on average, in low transparent countries more 
than 80 per cent of income per capita is needed to register a business, compare to the 13 
per cent in countries with high transparency.  
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Source: Cost of business: World Development Indicators, 2002; Ec/Institutional Transparency Index 2005.   
 
Furthermore, transparency in the public sector can also be a direct mechanism to promote 
competition. When the process to allocate public contracts is transparent, greater 
competition among suppliers results in better quality of the services and goods offered 16 
                                                 
16 The following question was taken from the EOS survey as proxy for transparency in public contracts: 
4.12 When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials usually favour well-connected firms 
and individuals or are neutral? And for quality of local suppliers: 9.07. The quality of local suppliers in 
your country is poor as they are inefficient and have little technological capability or very goof as they are 
internationally competitive and assist in new products and process development? Correlation between both 
variables is 0.6. 
R2= -0.47 
Graph 4. Ec/Institutional Transparency and Cost to register a business 
R2=0.59 
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Transparency is also associated with other governance indicators such as control of 
corruption and government effectiveness. As the regressions in Table A1 of the Appendix 
show, transparency is significant in reducing corruption, even after controlling for 
differences in income per capita and administrative regulations. Different specifications, 
including two variables for corruption -control of corruption (KK) or composite bribery 
(EOS)- and testing for any of the three indices of transparency does not alter the main 
result. Administrative regulations are important in curbing corruption but also the degree 
of institutional transparency and the degree of political transparency in the country. 
 
 
Graph 5. Ec/Institutional transparency and Bribe frequency & Graph 6. Political 
Transparency and Corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bribe Frequency: EOS 2004, Control of Corruption: KK 2004, Ec/Institutional Transparency Index, 
2005, Political Transparency Index, 2005. 
 
 
In table A2 of the appendix we test the marginal contribution of economic/institutional 
transparency on global competitiveness; the result is a highly significant impact even 
after controlling for income per capita. The same for government effectiveness (see Table 
A4 of the appendix and Graph 7). For the same level of income, a country with a more 
transparent environment has more effective government agencies in providing public 
services. As one could expect, government effectiveness is influenced to a greater extent 
by institutional transparency than political. What is noteworthy is that both variables go 
hand in hand in explaining control of corruption (see graphs above), highlighting the 
value of transparency and disclosure of information within the institutions themselves 
and also the role of social monitoring. In the case of political transparency, graph 6 shows 
a U-shaped curve suggesting important non-linearities in the marginal contribution to 
control of corruption: political transparency is powerful where there is some degree of 
political competition - if there is no competition (quasi-authoritarian or 'managed' 
democracies), then the impact of political transparency in curbing corruption is much 
lower. 
To analyze further the influence of transparency and the political system on variables 
such as global competitiveness and control of corruption, we introduce an interactive 
term in the regression to test the hypothesis that political transparency is likely to have an 
impact on countries with certain level of political freedom where political rights are 
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guaranteed. The results are shown in Table A3 of the appendix. The interactive term is 
positive and highly significant, suggesting that political transparency is likely to have an 
impact only after reaching a threshold of political rights, that is when political institutions 
in the country play a meaningful role and are representative. This has important policy 
implications, as efforts to increase demand-led activities and social participation to 
enhance institutional transparency and accountability will only be successful in countries 
where political rights are guaranteed and the media, political parties, parliament and other 
democratic institutions are independent and have real decision-making capacity.    
 
Graph 7. Government Effectiveness (KK) & Ec/Institutional Transparency 
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The importance of demand of information in pressing for transparency reforms can be 
assessed using the number of radios per capita as a proxy. We have seen some evidence 
in the literature of the role of the mass media in spreading and coordinating information 
among citizens and the radio is still the most extended way of communication across the 
world. Table A5 of the appendix presents the results of the regression analysis in which 
transparency in a country is explained by the number of radios per capita and the income 
per capita. Even after controlling per income, the number of radios per capita is highly 
influential in the degree of overall transparency. This relation holds for the full sample of 
countries and the non-OECD countries. The radio, however, is no longer the main way of 
mass communication in OECD countries and therefore its relationship with the degree of 
transparency in this group of countries is not significant. Further research will have to be 
done on the impact of other communication technologies such as the internet or television 
on the level of institutional and political transparency in rich countries.  
 
Lastly, to explore the effect of transparency on human development, we have run a 
regression where transparency and income per capita explain the level of development of 
a country measured by three human development indicators: life expectancy at birth, 
female literacy rate and child immunization. In each case, transparency appears to be 
significantly related to human development even after controlling for income per capita. 
See A6 and Graphs A2 and A3 in the appendix. 
 
Sources: Government Effectiveness: KK 2004, Ec/Institutional Transparency Index, 2005. 
R2 = 0.76 
  
 32
As we have seen, transparency can be associated with better economic and human 
development indicators. However, correlation does not imply causality and even though 
we have tried to account for differences in income per capita, further research needs to be 
done to disentangle the causal relationship between transparency and human and 
economic development. The limitations of the data available pose a great challenge for 
any advance in this area. More indicators are required to capture the different dimensions 
of transparency but also time-series to capture the temporal dimension. 
 
Given this considerations, it is important to look at micro data within one country. Based 
on an in-depth survey of 1,250 officials in over 100 public institutions in Bolivia, 
Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta (2003) explore the impact of transparency on public 
service delivery. In this study transparency is measured as the percentage of cases where 
the actions of public officials and the decision making are transparent. The main results 
indicate that service delivery performance depends negatively on the level of corruption 
and positively on external voice of users and transparency. Furthermore, voice and 
transparency related determinants seem to be more relevant in explaining performance of 
public agencies than conventional public sector management variables such as wage 
satisfaction or meritocracy.  
 
Graph 8. Transparency of Public Institutions and Public Service Delivery and Graph 9. 
Transparency of Public Institutions and Purchase of public positions, Bolivia. 
 
 
 
Source: Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta (2003), based on 90 national, departmental and 
municipal agencies covered in the Public Officials Survey. 
 
Bribery and corruption was also found to depend positively on the degree of politization 
and negatively on internal transparency of the agency and on meritocracy. The graphs 
above show how institutions with higher transparency standards were seen as providing 
services of better quality and how internal transparency within government agencies was 
significant in preventing the purchase of public positions.   
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The study tries to account for endogeneity, that is, the possible spurious correlation 
between the dependent and independent variables that might exist due to the effect of 
some non-observable factor across variables by the same firm, known as “kvetch” factor. 
To address this possible bias, different “kvetch” control factors are included such as 
extent of government inefficiency, extent of government helpfulness, quality of public 
services and quality of the postal service as viewed by the firm. Yet in all cases, the 
inclusion of the “kvetch” control variable did not alter the magnitude and significance of 
the other variables in the different specifications.  
  
 
VII   Policy Applications:  Transparency Reforms as Second Generation 
Institutional Change.        
  
Despite their potential benefits, transparency reforms have been insufficiently appreciated 
and integrated into institutional reform programs. This is surprising given that 
transparency programs are well-suited to overcome two of the lessons drawn by Levy and 
Kpundeh (2004) when reviewing past experience in institutional reform. Firstly, that the 
obstacles of building state capacity are at least as political as they are technical and 
therefore more attention should paid to the demand side. Transparency reforms can be 
very effective in altering the incentives of political leaders to serve a broad range of 
social groups. Secondly, that institutional reform is a cumulative process where it is key 
to identify entry points for reform which even though modest in themselves, have the 
potential to catalyze further changes down the road. Again, given their effectiveness in 
mobilizing social support and given that that they are not necessarily intensive in 
resources; transparency programs might be politically more feasible and constitute 
invaluable entry-points to other institutional reforms.  
 
In many countries, while some progress has been made in economic transparency, that is 
not the case in political transparency or social monitoring and hence more focus is needed 
on this area. Top-down oversight strategies need to be complemented with bottom-up 
mechanisms designed to improve government accountability. In recent years, a growing 
number of initiatives have been based on civil society participation to strengthening 
accountability in the public sector. Initiatives such as participatory budgeting, 
administrative reform acts, social audits, citizen report cards, and community score cards 
all involve citizens in the oversight of government and are considered “social 
accountability” initiatives. One of them is the "Transparency pacts" implemented in 
Colombia as instruments to combat corruption and promote efficiency. The transparency 
agreements are signed between local elected officials and their constituents whereby the 
town hall provides the community with information related to the performance of local 
institutions and a committee is established with representatives from civil society to 
monitor performance and hold local authorities accountable.  
 
Other initiatives of social accountability in Latin America and the Caribbean where 
citizens play an important role in the definition; monitoring and evaluation of government 
activities are described in Civil Society Team (2003). Cases such as the Community 
Information System for Primary Health Care in the Municipality of Arismendi 
(Venezuela) or the Participatory Monitoring of Land and Housing Policy in the 
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Municipality of Quilmes (Argentina) show that civil society and public institutions can 
complement each other in enhancing quality of public services.  
 
Moreover, transparency reforms can be substitutes to the otherwise common tendency in 
governance or institutional reforms to over-regulate and create additional public 
institutions (such as Anticorruption agencies, etc). Among other benefits, information 
disclosure programs are generally thought to cost the government far less than drafting 
and implementing industry wide regulations. As a result of these presumed benefits, 
information disclosure programs might also be politically more feasible than new 
coercive regulations. Same as with the FOI laws, disclosure requirements empower 
citizens to monitor performance of private corporations. Thus, information disclosure 
programs have been characterized as the third wave of environmental regulation – 
following the original regulatory approach and the subsequent introduction of market-
based incentives (Cohen, 2001). The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), one of the most 
celebrated transparency policies in the US, is credited with reducing toxic releases by 
nearly half in a little more than a decade with the consequent reduction in accidents in 
chemical plants17. Other disclosure programs in the US have focused on drinking water 
safety and risk management plans for chemical releases and similar programs have been 
implemented in other countries and contexts, including India, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Afsah et al., 1997). 
Voluntary information disclosure is also growing as a result of social demand. A study on 
the 1,000 largest global companies found that 24 per cent of them had issued 
environmental reports in 1999 compared to 17 per cent in 1996 (KPMG, 1999). The 
Global Reporting Initiative, a voluntary framework for environmental and sustainability 
reporting, recently reported that over 100 companies worldwide have adopted their new 
reporting standards18. Another initiative that is growing is the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) which aims to increase transparency in transactions 
between governments and companies within extractive industries. The objective is the 
publication on a regular basis of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies 
to governments and all material revenues received by governments from these companies 
to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
In addition, the EITI requires that payments and revenues are independently audited, 
applying international auditing standards.  
                                                 
17 Such as the accident in the pesticide plant in Bhopal (India) which killed more than 2,000 people and 
injured more than 10,000 and was in partly responsible for the adoption of the disclosure law. See Cohen 
(2002) and Fung, Graham and Weil (2002) for more details on this and other disclosure programs in the 
US.    
18 See www.globalreporting.org. 
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Box 6. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
 
What is EITI? 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of governments, companies, civil 
society groups, investors and international organizations. The EITI supports improved governance in 
resource rich countries through the full publication and verification of company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining. Many countries are rich in oil, gas, and minerals and studies have shown 
that when governance is good, these can generate large revenues to foster economic growth and reduce 
poverty. However when governance is weak, they may instead cause poverty, corruption, and conflict – the 
so called “resource curse”. The EITI aims to defeat this “curse” by improving transparency and 
accountability. 
 
What are the benefits of implementing EITI? 
The primary beneficiaries of EITI are the governments and citizens of resource-rich countries. Knowing what 
governments receive, and what companies pay, is critical first step to holding decision-makers accountable 
for the use of those revenues. 
Resource-rich countries implementing EITI can benefit from an improved investment climate by providing a 
clear signal to investors and the international financial institutions that the government is committed to 
strengthening transparency and accountability over natural resource revenues. Companies and investors, by 
supporting EITI in countries where they operate, can help mitigate investment risk: corruption creates 
political instability, which in turn threatens investments which are often capital intensive and long-term in 
nature. Civil society can benefit from an increased amount of information in the public domain about those 
revenues that governments manage on behalf of citizens, thereby increasing accountability and improving 
transparency. In summary, implementing EITI as part of a programme of improved governance will help to 
ensure that oil, gas, and mining revenues contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction. 
 
Which countries are implementing EITI? 
Some twenty countries have either endorsed, or are now actively implementing EITI across the world – from 
Peru, to Trinidad and Tobago, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and East Timor. For the most recent list of countries and 
information on what they are doing, look at the “Implementation” section of the EITI website at 
http://www.eitransparency.org/countryupdates.htm 
 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are also being subject of the growing demand 
for transparency. The Global Transparency Initiative has developed the IFI Transparency 
Resource which recommends transparency standards for IFIs and evaluates ten IFIs19 
across 250 transparency indicators, covering areas such as governing bodies, policies and 
strategies, lending cycle and accountability mechanisms among others. 
 
Transparency reforms, while they often require some political capital and leadership, 
generally are not as costly as other institutional reforms in terms of resources or capacity. 
Reforms to increase the freedom of the press, disclosure of contributions to political 
parties, financial disclosure programs for public officials, the publication of public 
tenders or other information relevant on internet are all transparency reforms that are not 
resource-demanding. In fact, once the benefit side is factored in, other transparency 
reforms such as e-procurement or control systems to prevent corruption are likely to be 
huge net savers of resources.  
                                                 
19 The IFIs evaluated are: African Development Bank (AFDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), International Financial Corporation (IFC), Inter-American Investment 
Corporation (IIC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
and World Bank (WB). More information on www.ifitransparencyresource.org 
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The study carried by KPMG (2002) with the collaboration of 700 UK purchase managers 
estimate the typical benefits in e-procurement in around 7.8 per cent with no significant 
differences between the private sector and the public sector. Similarly, the State of North 
Carolina has estimated the benefits attributable to E-Procurement in the first two full 
years after the system was implemented in $162 million in savings: $127 million in price 
reduction savings, and $35 million in purchase order creation efficiencies. And 'Project 
Zanzibar' an ambitious central government electronic marketplace to be implemented 
initially among 78 US central government departments and agencies could save the 
public sector $100m over three years.   
Private firms can play an important role in disseminating information and ensuring the 
benefits of transparency are maximized. Leslie and Zoido (2005) assess the role of a 
profit-seeking firm, Transparent Markets (TM), in collecting and selling information 
about forthcoming drug procurement auctions in Buenos Aires hospitals. Their empirical 
analysis indicates that the information helps potential bidders to participate in more 
auctions for more drugs at more hospitals, and to participate in auctions which tend to 
have relatively fewer competing bidders. It is estimated that TM caused a 2.9% decrease 
in the total cost of drugs for these hospitals which in absolute terms constituted a saving 
of US$2.9 million, or 9.4 million Argentine pesos. The firm provided value for both their 
customers and procurers, at the expense of bidders that do not purchase the 
announcement information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 7. e-Transparency for Development: Improving Government Services for Rural Citizens in India
 
In 2000, the State Government in Madhya Pradesh, India, set up a chain of computer kiosks to help 
provide better access to government information and services in one of its districts – Dhar District. 20 
kiosks ("soochanalayas") were initially set up in various rural centres, with each kiosk typically serving a 
population of 20,000-30,000 villagers.  A further 18 kiosks were added later.   
eTransparency-related information and services provided include: 
• Land records: farmers can apply for the official map and land record required to apply for loans.    
• Below poverty line and other lists so that families can check directly to see whether or not they are 
listed before applying for special welfare schemes.  
• Grievance registration against public servants without traveling to district headquarters.    
• Market prices: prices for agricultural goods from the district wholesale markets are made available to 
farmers via the kiosk.  Farmers can then wait until the right price is reached, rather than having to rely 
on intermediaries or loss US$0.50 of income making a special journey to distant market. 
• Other services set up include: rural email facility; a village auction site; a matrimonial site; an "ask the 
wiseman" service for children; an "ask the expert" service for farmers; a village newspaper; an e-
education site; and employment news (aimed at semi-skilled workers). 
Gyandoot is one of few e-transparency projects to have made a specific effort at assisting disadvantaged 
groups. Although the project has still many challenges in terms of financial sustainability, infrastructure, 
improve attention to schemes for the poor, it has already delivered some benefits of transparency: 
- The project has fully succeeded in generating awareness (72% of users) of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) amongst the rural community at large. Specifically, the youth (16% of 
users) are excited about the new employment opportunities arising out of ICT. 
- The citizens perceive a shift in corruption levels, especially in terms of access to information and lesser 
harassment by the government officials. While more attention is needed to new forms of corruption that 
have substitute previous channels. 
- Government officials feel that Gyandoot has improved their accountability. Now they have to comply with 
promised time of complaint disposal. This is also expressed by 25% of the users. 
- Transport costs, wage losses and discrimination have been reduced on some occasions, especially for 
the most disadvantaged groups (from lower castes, or the disabled).  Public availability of welfare scheme 
lists has also enable families to correct their omission from the lists.  
Source: A. K. Sanjay and V. Gupta, Gyandoot: Trying to Improve Government Services for Rural Citizens 
in India, Case Study num. 11, eGovernment for Development 2003
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And these are only examples of direct and quantifiable benefits of transparency. Other 
benefits such as the prevention of bankruptcies, savings due to prevention of corruption, 
reduction in racial and gender discrimination or health benefits are much more difficult to 
quantify.  The following two examples were mentioned in the study carried out by Fung, 
Graham and Wei (2002). The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 which 
requires food processors to label products with amounts of key nutrients was an 
important step towards transparency in the United States where chronic diseases such as 
heart ailments, cancer and diabetes are the largest cause of preventable deaths, killing 
more than 1,5 million people every year. Disclosure is intended in this case to encourage 
Americans to eat healthier food and put pressure on manufactures to produce healthier 
products. In the same vein, the prestigious Institute of Medicine called in 1999 for a new 
disclosure system to reduce medical mistakes in hospitals, another largest cause of death 
in the United States. High rates of errors are costly not only in terms of deaths and 
injuries but also in loss of trust by patients in the health care system, loss of morale by 
health care professionals, loss of productivity. In economic terms alone, estimated 
national cost of preventable hospital errors20 resulting in injury or death totaled in 
between $17 and 29 billion a year. 
 
Transparency reforms might be politically more feasible that other institutional reforms, 
given that they are less resource-demanding, more effective in mobilizing social support 
and suitable for gradual implementations. However, it is important to pay attention to the 
cost and benefits to potential users and disclosers of information when designing those 
reforms. Disclosing information can clash with the interest of groups, organizations or 
individuals who might be better off with the current situation. At the same time, the 
benefits of disclosure are often diffuse. Beneficiaries may be consumers, investors, 
employees, rural community residents who might not be even aware of the impact of 
such reforms which in any case may take some time to materialize. A detailed analysis of 
the nature of the information problem and the costs and benefits to different social agents 
in each case can help in designing a reform that fosters support and ensures sustainability. 
 
Unfortunately not many studies have looked deep into the political economy of 
transparency reforms. One exception in this area is the study carry out by Fung, Graham 
and Weil (2002) on six cases from the United States21. The study analyzes the dynamics 
of transparency and what makes some initiatives to improve over time and have the 
planned social and economic impact while others degenerate into costly paperwork 
exercises.  Substantial benefits to users, the presence of third party organizations to press 
for system improvement, and economic or political dynamics that lead some disclosers to 
promote improved transparency are all factors that influence sustainability. 
In the last part of this section, we are going to describe two case studies. The first one is 
the implementation of financial disclosure programs for public officials. The second case 
                                                 
20 Preventable errors are not due to rare slips or bad doctors, but to patterns of health care that have created 
systematic risks. 
21 The reforms analyzed are: financial disclosure to reduce investment risks to the public; banks’ reporting 
of home-lending practices to minimize racial and gender discrimination; nutritional labeling to reduce risks 
of chronic disease; disclosure of toxic releases to minimize pollution; financial reporting by labor unions to 
minimize corruption; and efforts to create a transparency system for tracking medical mistakes in hospitals. 
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study looks deep into the situation of Chile, the third country in the world in terms of 
institutional transparency but which is lagging behind in political transparency.   
 
Financial Disclosure for Public Officials 
One area that is receiving increasing attention in the new wave towards transparency is 
financial disclosure programs for public officials. While these requirements were first 
imposed on the executive branch, they now are accepted as applying to members of the 
legislative and judicial branches22 as well. In some countries asset declarations are 
recently being published under new FOI laws. Public or not, income and asset disclosure 
can be an invaluable tool to promote transparency and accountability in the public sector 
if properly designed and effectively applied. The box below lists ten best practices related 
to the implementation of financial disclosure. Issues such as the content of the declaration 
(including assets of spouses and dependents), the verification of the information, 
investigation and sanctions for illegal enrichment are aspect of ultimate importance when 
designing a financial disclosure program.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Details of financial disclosure programs of 35 countries are included in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. The information has been obtained from two sources: the World Bank 
Administrative and Civil Service Reform website and the Public Integrity index  (see 
                                                 
22 An interesting review of the implementation of income and asset disclosure for judges in 6 Eastern 
European and Latin American countries (Argentina, Georgia, Moldova, Paraguay, Peru and Romania) can 
be found in Henderson (ed.) (2004).   
Box 8. Ten best practices in financial disclosure programs. 
1. Assets to be disclosed: for thorough compliance with the principle, the disclosure of assets should be 
broad, including any real estate and movable property, intangible, rights, non-material assets, all kinds of 
income, participation in corporations or other kind of business and any other type of property that may 
have an economic value. 
2. Persons who must disclose: consensus exists that financial disclosure should be mandatory for public 
officials in the three branches of power: legislative, executive and judiciary. What it seems not so clear is 
whether it should be applied to all levels in public administration or only to top-levels. Due to lack of 
resources most countries only request middle and senior officials to declare their assets. 
3. Family members: public officials should disclose not only their own property but also that of their spouses 
and minor children, individually or as a group. The rationale for including family members is to avert the 
divestment of income and assets by a judge to family members to avoid disclosure.   
4. What to disclose: disclosure should include any real property, intangible rights, non-material assets, all 
forms of income and their sources, any participation in corporations or other kind of businesses as well as 
foundations. In addition, it should include all financial obligations, business relationships and gifts. It is 
advisable to request a copy of the annual income tax declaration submitted to ensure consistency.   
5. Time of disclosure: the disclosure should be done before assuming the office, when finishing the term, and 
annually while in the position. 
6. Accessibility of the information: the asset declarations should be easily accessible to the general public, 
and the person requesting the information should not be investigated for requesting it. The law should 
explain clearly which the process to access the information is.  
7. Collecting entity: the entity collecting the disclosure of assets should have a clear procedure for collecting, 
systematizing and disclosing the information and this entity should have a determined degree of autonomy 
and not be completely dependent on the institutions whose officials are obligated to disclose their assets. 
8. Enforcement mechanism and verification: an independent institution, such as the collecting office, should 
be in charge of the implementation of a preventive mechanism which monitors compliance with the 
disclosure and verifies the contents of the statements. The establishment of a systemic, accessible report 
should be developed and maintained on an on-going basis. This office must also have powers and budget 
to follow up the information provided and investigate cases of potential illegal enrichment and conflict of 
interests arising from the disclosure statements. The office must also be competent to act as a denouncing 
party in front of a prosecutor or a judge. 
9. Sanctions for non-complianc : a clear system of sanctions should be established for those officers who do 
not present the information in a timely manner. 
10. Illegal enrichment as a crime: Excessive assets, income, gifts, and liabilities that grossly outweigh one’s 
earned salary are all indicators of illegal enrichment. Criminal Codes should include illegal enrichment as a 
crime, including public officials as potential perpetrators.  
11. Conflict of interest: disclosure of interest should be part of the financial disclosure. Legislation to prevent 
and penalize the conflict that may arise between the public duty and private interest of public officials 
should be in place. 
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annex). Examples of countries where asset declaration is mandatory for public officials 
are (in brackets where the declaration is public): Albania (public), Argentina (public for 
parliamentarians), Bangladesh, Brazil (public for parliamentarians), Colombia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia (public), Italia (public), Kenya (public for parliamentarians), 
Korea (public), Latvia (public), Mexico (public optional), Nicaragua (public for 
parliamentarians), Panama, Philippines (public), Portugal (public), Romania, South 
Africa ((public for parliamentarians), Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda 
(public), Ukraine, USA (public) and Venezuela (public for parliamentarians).     
 
However, for the disclosure program to be effective resources should be devoted for 
verification and investigation. The Police Royal Commission Report (2005) on 
corruption in the Malaysian police force revealed that no action was taken against a 
senior officer who made an asset declaration amounting to RM34 million. Sometimes, 
there is not institutional capacity to even enforce the disclosure requirement. Indonesian 
law requires that asset disclosure reports be filled out by almost 55,000 elected officials 
and top government officers and returned to a specific government office within a 
prescribed period of time. Without sufficient funds for the office to follow up, only about 
50 percent of those required to return the report actually do so. 
An effective and simple way of avoiding this type of situations is to make the asset 
declarations available to the general public. Social monitoring and social has proven to be 
very effective, especially in countries with scare resources.  An intermediate option is the 
one followed by Mexico, where public officials can decide whether to make the 
declaration public or not. In practice, top level officials end up publishing their 
declarations due to social pressure. The lifestyle checks carried out by the Philippine 
Center for Investigative Journalism are an example of how social monitoring can improve 
effectiveness of asset declarations as tools against corruption. The Center conducts 
lifestyle checks on public officials23 and assesses consistency with the statement of assets 
and liabilities that government employees are required to file every year. Describe. The 
Center spent eight months investigating the unexplained wealth of Philippine President 
Joseph Estrada and their reports became cornerstones in the impeachment trial against the 
President (for more details see Møller and Jackson, 2004). 
Chile: unbundling transparency 
In the global report on governance published by the World Bank in 2004, Chile occupies 
one of the first 30 places, among 200 countries, in terms of government effectiveness and 
quality of the rule of law.  Likewise, Chile is found among the first 25 places in control of 
corruption, and in 12th place in quality of the regulatory framework.  The average for the 
rest of Latin America is located below number 100 in the indicators of governance.  Since 
1996 Chile has made considerable advances in these indices of governance, in contrast to 
the rest of the continent.  Although there is still an important gap with the “exemplary” 
Northern countries, the country has reached levels of governance of various rich 
countries of the OCDE. 
 
                                                 
23 The lifestyle checks are published on the web site of the Center (www.pcij.org/HotSeat/lifestyle). 
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The Central Bank of Chile is found among the best rated in the world in the evaluation 
carried out by Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003) on information provided by 19 
inflation-targeting central banks. Chile also comes out well evaluated in business surveys 
such as World Economic Forum one, for several manifestations of corruption.  When 
businessmen choose from a long list of problems which are the three primary obstacles to 
operate successfully in the country, only 3 per cent includes corruption. The high probity 
in Chile as for traditional demonstrations of corruption contrasts with the mediocre 
evaluation done by the same businessmen on illegal financing of political parties (with 
more than half discontent with the situation in the country, compared with Finland with 
less than 21%), and in different aspects of the provision of information by the 
government. Indeed, in our transparency index, Chile scores 2.38 in 
economic/institutional transparency and yet, it only scores 0.82 in political transparency. 
 
It would be, therefore, a serious error for Chile to enter into a comfort zone.  'Sunlight is 
the best disinfectant’ is an expression that summarizes the power of transparency.  
Transparency empowers citizens in terms of social monitoring, it can lead to savings in 
the provision of services (as the reduction in more than 50 per cent in the cost of public 
school lunches in Buenos Aires after being published), and it also allows to immediately 
investigate potential cases of illegal enrichment or lack of transparency in public 
purchases. Transparency is a great replacement of regulation without its costs.   
 
 
 
The challenge in Chile is consequently to make the relation between private money and 
political funding more transparent. Chile is currently discussing in Congress the draft of a 
financial disclosure law for public officials. This constitutes an opportunity to advance in 
this area as it happened with the quota reforms in the past.  A strategy that promotes 
transparency would include aspects such as financial disclosure, access to information 
law, public purchases and disclosure of electoral financing. Firstly, the adoption of an 
effective law on financial disclosure, which would apply to public officials, 
parliamentary and judges; would include espouses (officially married or not, with 
separation of goods or not) and also dependents; and would require the effective 
   Box 9. Basic Scorecard: 10 Transparency Reform Components 
• Public Disclosure of Assets and Incomes (and outside earnings) of Candidates, Public 
Officials, Politicians, Legislators - & dependents 
• Public Disclosure of Political Campaign contributions by individuals and firms, and of 
campaign expenditures 
• Public Disclosure of Parliamentary Votes, without exceptions 
• Effective Implementation of Conflict of Interest Laws, separating business, politics, 
legislation, & government 
• Publicly blacklisting firms bribing in public procurement 
• Effective Implementation of Freedom of Information Law, with easy access to all to 
government information 
• Fiscal/Financial transparency: central/local budgets; EITI 
• E-procurement: transparency (web) and competition 
• Adoption and implementation of ‘Lobby Law’ 
• Judiciary transparency and disclosure on funding, assets of judges, and on full disclosure of 
judicial decisions 
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verification of the content of those declarations and clear sanctions to illegal enrichment.  
In addition, it is necessary to typify the crime of illegal enrichment.  Publication of asset 
declarations is also important, with easy access to all, over the Internet, annually (not 
every four years or only to enter or to leave the charge published.  
 
Secondly, it is required to have free access to public information. Chile has been 
legislating in this area for years now, for example with the Law of Probity of 1999, but in 
an inadequate form. Different public distributions dictate regulations that hinder 
obtaining information, and the exceptions are too general and subject to the will of the 
public servants.  A modern law on access to information is required to provide in a quick 
and efficient way (and on the Internet) public information, with very few exceptions, 
captured in the law.  Just as it was done recently in Mexico with the creation of the 
Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Information (IFAI), it would be useful to create an 
institution to promote the right of access to information with budgetary autonomy and 
decision-making powers.  In Mexico today, instead of remaining without information, or 
waiting and appealing for months in courts, if an applicant is denied access to 
information, or she or he claims to have obtained partial information, it is possible to go 
to the IFAI24. Some tax evasions and details of the rescue of the bank by the government 
during the crisis known as “tequilazo" have been revealed in this way. Another important 
area in terms of transparency is procurement. It is crucial to complement the advance 
already achieved by Chilecompra (as to competitive bidding) with similar advances for 
‘sole sourced’ procurement.  There would be a need to eliminate general guidelines that 
do not permit the publication of invitations to bid because of 'confidential and reserved' 
clauses, which in practice mean that all public procurement of some Ministries could be 
except from the transparency requirement  
 
Finally, there are also pending measures on political financing, given the instinctive 
tendency of private money to influence the public sphere.  Publishing on the Internet who 
contributes what to which candidate and political parties would be an important step 
towards transparency, same as the publication of the expenses in electoral campaigns.  In 
addition, the adoption of lobby legislation is still outstanding to make this activity more 
transparent, and at the same time facilitate the participation of social groups poorly 
organized (small farmers, consumers, etc). Every supplier of the State that has been 
caught in bribery acts should be excluded from the system of public purchases.  Similarly 
to what the World Bank does. The Bank is the only international organization that 
publishes a “black list", which is on the Bank’s website and contains 300 companies and 
individuals that cannot submit a bid for having been involved in corrupt acts.   
 
 
                                                 
24 ww.ifai.org.mx 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
Despite their potential to promote accountability of public institutions and improve 
government efficiency in the provision of public services, transparency reforms have 
been insufficiently appreciated and integrated into institutional reform programs. Most of 
the literature has focused on the role of transparency in preventing financial crises and in 
monetary policy-making. It is only recently that more attention has been paid to 
information asymmetries in political markets and the role that transparency can play in 
improving efficiency in the provision of public services. This is partly a consequence of 
the lack of progress that has been made in codifying and measuring different dimensions 
of transparency compared with advances in other areas such as corruption. In fact, in part 
of the literature, corruption and transparency are treated as synonymous despite being 
completely different phenomena. 
 
In this paper we have tried to contribute to such an effort with the construction of an 
aggregate index of transparency for 194 countries based on more than 20 independent 
sources combining objective assessments of transparency with “perception-based” data. 
The index is developed around two different components: economic/institutional 
transparency and political transparency. Increasing transparency through accessible, 
relevant, and accurate information is necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
accountability. Citizens also need the capacity and resources, political and financial, to 
exercise that right effectively. Our results suggest that transparency is not necessarily the 
domain of any geographical region or cultural background with countries from all over 
the world occupying the top positions in the raking. OECD countries enjoy similar levels 
of economic/institutional and political transparency while in most parts of the world 
further advances are still to needed for the level of political transparency to reach the 
standards set in the economic/institutional arena 
 
Transparency is not a question of major financial resources either.  Many steps can be 
taken to enhance transparency in the political system or to increase the freedom of the 
press that do not require a great amount of resources but serious commitment on the part 
of the government. However, institutions also need to be strengthened to be able to meet 
the new demand for information. Our results show the role donors can play in those 
countries that have shown commitment towards transparency by undertaking some 
transparency reforms but need resources and technical assistance to be able to implement 
more challenging ones. Transparency also appears to be significant in reducing 
corruption. Together with administrative regulations, the degree of transparency in the 
institution and the degree of political transparency in the country have a significant effect 
in curbing corruption. In the case of political transparency, the relationship is not linear: 
political transparency is powerful where there is some degree of political competition. 
That is, political transparency is only influential after reaching certain levels where 
institutions in the country play a meaningful role. If there is no competition (quasi-
authoritarian or “managed” democracies), then the impact of political transparency in 
curbing corruption is much lower. The results also show the importance of the demand 
for information and the media in pressing for transparency reforms. 
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From the analysis, it seems clear that transparency is associated with better economic and 
human development indicators, even after controlling for differences in income. Thus, for 
the same level of income per capita, countries ranking higher in the overall transparency 
index are also more competitive in international markets, and their population has a 
higher life expectancy at birth and higher rates of female literacy and child immunization.  
Although other studies (Glennerster and Shin, 2003; Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta, 
2003) support the idea of a positive causal effect running from better governance to better 
outcomes, further research needs to be done to disentangle the causal relationship 
between transparency and development when more transparency indicators and time-
series become available worldwide.  
 
The skeptics of transparency might be right in pointing out the interest of international 
investors behind the global movement towards transparency and its limitations in 
challenging the status quo in countries with a high degree of state capture or predatory 
leadership. However, this might also underestimate the power of transparency and its 
irreversibility. Once the institutional files are open to public scrutiny, it becomes difficult 
for any government to backtrack or be selective about the information that is going to be 
accessible, and it is only a matter of time before demands for transparency in other areas 
arise. In fact, international financial institutions and multinational corporations are 
already being the target of those demands. Breaking up the monopoly of information will 
empower civil society in developing countries to participate in discussions about their 
own future. Transparency is already changing the way citizens all over the world are 
relating to their governments and constitutes a unique opportunity to make governments 
accountable and start reversing the distortions created in the internal democratic process 
during the decolonization process and decades of international aid.  
 
In concluding on an interim basis in this work-in-progress endeavor on transparency, we 
emphasize not only the preliminary nature of this work, so to elicit feedback at an early 
stage, but also the need for delving deeper into some key issues, such as validation and 
finalization of worldwide transparency indices (with its proposed sub-components), 
further work on untangling directions of causality in the significant associations that are 
evident from the data, and further deepening on the concrete policy applications by 
providing a framework to tailor transparency strategies and different types of 
transparency reforms to different typologies of countries. 
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 APPENDIX 1. Financial Disclosure Policies 
 
  Head of State Parliamentarians Public Officials 
  mandatory public mandatory public time period 
to access 
cost to 
access 
mandatory family 
members 
public time to 
access 
cost to 
access 
Albania  no - no - - - yes, middle and 
senior officials 
yes yes25      
Argentina  yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) >1 month (1) free or cost of 
copies (1) 
yes, only senior   yes (1) >1 month (1) free or cost of 
photocopy (1) 
Australia  no (0) no (0) yes (1) yes (1) >1 month (1) often (0.75) no 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh  no - no - - - yes, all public 
officials 
yes no     
Brazil  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes all public 
officials 
  no (0) 0 0 
Colombia  yes  no yes no - - yes all public 
officials 
 no no - - 
Germany  no (0) - no  (0)26 - - - no - 0 0 0 
Ghana  yes (1) no (0) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) sometimes 
(0.5) 
yes, middle and 
senior officials 
no no (0) 0 0 
Guatemala  yes (1) no (0) yes (1) no (0)  - -  yes, senior   no (0) 0 0 
India  no (0) - yes yes (1) > 1yr (0.25) sometimes 
(0.5) 
yes, senior27  no no (0) 0 0 
Indonesia yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes   yes (1) >1 month (1) released by 
the press (1) 
Italy  no (0) - yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes   yes (1) >1 year, not 
updated   (0) 
free (1) 
Japan  yes (1 )28 yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) no - 0 0 0 
Kenya  yes (1) no (0) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) often (0.75) yes, senior yes no (0) 0 0 
Korea  yes yes yes yes yes, >1 
month 
free yes, middle and 
senior officials 
yes yes >1 month released by 
the press 
                                                 
25 Although the law doesn’t mention how citizens can access the information 
26 There is no asset disclosure requirement; although MPs have to disclose publicly their positions in various organizations and corporations and whether they continue their pre-
mandate occupation. That information is very comprehensive and publicly available 
27 Each cadre of officials has its distinct set of rules 
28 Although there is no regulation, asset disclosure has been established as a practice among Cabinet Ministers 
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Latvia  no - no - - - yes, middle and 
senior officials 
no yes >1 month released by 
the press 
Mexico  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) sometimes 
(0.5) 
yes, middle and 
senior officials 
yes optional (0) 0 0 
Namibia  no (0) - yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) no - optional (0) 0 0 
Nicaragua  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes   has to be 
motivated29   
(1) 
>1 month (1) free (1) 
Nigeria  yes (1) no (0) yes (1) no (0) 0 0 only when 
necessary, 
senior 
only 
unmarried 
children 
under 18yr 
no (0) 0 0 
Panama  yes (1) no (0) no30  no (0) 0 0 yes (1)   no (0) 0 0 
Philippines  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes, all public 
officials 
yes yes (1) delays due to 
record 
retrieval (0.75) 
free (1) 
Portugal  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes dn yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) 
Romania  yes no yes no - - yes, senior yes no     
Russia  yes (1) yes (1) yes no - - no mandatory31  - 0 0 0 
South 
Africa  
yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1 )32 >1 month (1) free (1) yes dn no (0) 0 0 
Sri Lanka  yes no yes no - - yes, senior yes no      
Tanzania  yes no no - - - yes, middle and 
senior officials 
yes discretion of 
minister 
    
Thailand  yes no yes no - - yes, senior yes no     
Turkey  yes (1) no (0) yes no - - yes, all public 
officials 
yes no (0) 0 0 
Uganda  yes yes yes yes     yes, middle and 
senior 
yes yes     
                                                 
29 The disclosure has to be motivated the Comptroller’s Office and to the official. The Comptroller can allow or not for the disclosure 
30 Only, the president of Parliament has to submit an asset disclosure 
31 By law they are expected to provide asset info but there is no asset declaration per se. In practice what it is available is scant and not very telling. Citizens have access through the 
press.  
32 Only the public section of the disclosure form 
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USA  yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) yes (1) >1 month (1) free (1) yes, almost all 
federal officials 
(each state has  
own legislation) 
yes yes (1) > 6 months 
(0.5) 
free or cost of 
copy and 
mailing (1) 
Ukraine  yes (1) yes 33 no (0) 0 0 0 no (0)  0 0 0 0 
Venezuela  yes (1) yes (1) yes yes (1) no (0) no (0) yes (1)   no (0) 0 0 
Zimbabwe  no (0) - no - - - no   0 0 0 
 
 
 
Sources 
 
Public Integrity index (score in brackets) http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga/ 
 
25 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, the 
Philippines, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
 
Questions: 
- In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants? 
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants within a reasonable time period? 
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants at a reasonable cost? 
- In law, are there conflict of interest regulations for senior civil servants? 
- In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of parliamentarians? 
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of parliamentarians within a reasonable time period? 
- In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of parliamentarians at a reasonable cost? 
 
 
WB Administrative and Civil Service Reform website (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/assets.htm) 
 
Review of asset disclosure laws of 18 countries (Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Ghana, India, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and the United States) with information on: 
- Historical Information 
- Coverage 
- Filing frequency and method 
- Declaration content 
- Punishment for breach 
- Public access 
 
                                                 
33 The asset declaration of presidential candidates are published in mass media 
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Appendix 2. Transparency index 200434 (preliminary- not for quotation or to establish 
rankings) 
 
  Ec/Institutional Transparency Political Transparency Overall Transparency 
  score %rank std. error35 score %rank std. error score %rank 
AFGHANISTAN -1.21 2 0.37 -1.08 17 0.18 -1.15 7 
ALBANIA -0.10 59 0.35 0.03 48 0.12 -0.04 52 
ALGERIA -0.42 43 0.25 -0.74 28 0.16 -0.58 28 
ANDORRA -0.42 44 0.41 1.27 92 0.20 0.43 69 
ANGOLA -0.68 25 0.25 -0.81 26 0.16 -0.74 23 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA -1.11 5 0.37 0.08 50 0.20 -0.51 32 
ARGENTINA 0.81 80 0.26 0.46 59 0.16 0.63 78 
ARMENIA 0.26 68 0.35 -0.62 34 0.12 -0.18 42 
AUSTRALIA 2.20 98 0.31 1.24 91 0.16 1.72 98 
AUSTRIA 0.90 83 0.34 0.91 76 0.16 0.90 83 
AZERBAIJAN -0.71 20 0.33 -0.96 20 0.12 -0.83 18 
BAHAMAS -0.29 50 0.37 1.22 89 0.20 0.46 72 
BAHRAIN 0.01 63 0.36 -1.00 19 0.16 -0.50 33 
BANGLADESH -0.43 42 0.32 -0.79 27 0.16 -0.61 27 
BARBADOS -0.39 45 0.37 1.11 85 0.20 0.36 67 
BELARUS -0.16 58 0.35 -1.49 8 0.12 -0.82 19 
BELGIUM 1.02 85 0.34 1.39 97 0.16 1.20 91 
BELIZE 0.10 65 0.35 0.95 78 0.19 0.53 76 
BENIN -0.57 31 0.21 0.53 61 0.17 -0.02 52 
BHUTAN -0.69 23 0.35 -1.06 17 0.17 -0.88 15 
BOLIVIA 0.43 72 0.31 0.38 57 0.16 0.40 68 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA -0.20 56 0.34 -0.12 45 0.12 -0.16 44 
BOTSWANA -0.20 55 0.20 0.57 62 0.16 0.18 61 
BRAZIL 1.00 84 0.27 0.47 60 0.16 0.73 80 
BRUNEI -1.09 6 0.37 -1.17 14 0.19 -1.13 8 
BULGARIA 0.72 78 0.32 0.29 55 0.12 0.51 75 
BURKINA FASO -0.39 45 0.20 0.08 50 0.17 -0.16 45 
BURUNDI -0.62 28 0.25 -1.14 16 0.17 -0.88 14 
CAMBODIA -0.45 41 0.34 -0.59 35 0.17 -0.52 31 
CAMEROON -0.69 23 0.21 -0.92 22 0.17 -0.81 20 
CANADA 2.40 99 0.34 1.22 90 0.16 1.81 99 
CAPE VERDE -0.39 46 0.25 0.40 58 0.19 0.01 54 
CENTRAL AFR. REP. -1.12 4 0.25 -0.73 29 0.17 -0.92 11 
CHAD -0.80 17 0.20 -0.94 22 0.16 -0.87 15 
CHILE 2.38 99 0.29 0.82 69 0.16 1.60 96 
CHINA 0.34 68 0.33 -1.57 5 0.16 -0.62 27 
                                                 
34 An Unobserved Component Model (UCM) has been used to aggregate the individual variables in each transparency 
sub-component: Ec/institutional and Political. The Overall Transparency index was calculated as a simple average of 
those two sub-components. By construction the theoretical boundary of each index goes from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher 
scores corresponding to more transparency and a world average of 0. 
35 In spite of the considerable number of individual sources used, there are still substantial margins of error associated 
with these transparency estimates, which can be attributable to (i) cross-country differences in the number of sources in 
which a country appears, and (ii) differences in the precision of the sources in which each country appears. This implies 
among other things that caution is required when interpreting the results and it is not advisable to establish rankings or 
comparisons among countries. More information on governance indicators can be found on 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/q&a.htm#5 
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COLOMBIA 0.64 75 0.28 -0.51 37 0.16 0.06 56 
COMOROS -0.90 10 0.25 -0.02 46 0.18 -0.46 34 
CONGO -0.88 12 0.25 -0.40 38 0.17 -0.64 26 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) -0.78 18 0.25 -1.33 10 0.18 -1.05 8 
COSTA RICA 0.36 69 0.29 0.97 79 0.16 0.67 79 
CROATIA 0.63 75 0.32 0.21 52 0.12 0.42 69 
CUBA -0.57 31 0.41 -2.07 1 0.17 -1.32 4 
CYPRUS -0.17 58 0.36 0.93 77 0.16 0.38 68 
CZECH REPUBLIC 1.02 85 0.30 0.89 74 0.12 0.95 85 
DENMARK 1.89 97 0.34 1.45 100 0.16 1.67 97 
DJIBOUTI -0.88 13 0.25 -0.79 26 0.18 -0.83 17 
DOMINICA -0.50 35 0.35 1.10 84 0.20 0.30 64 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.68 76 0.34 0.20 51 0.16 0.44 70 
ECUADOR -0.31 48 0.29 0.22 53 0.16 -0.05 51 
EGYPT -0.47 37 0.20 -1.17 15 0.16 -0.82 19 
EL SALVADOR 0.53 74 0.29 0.34 56 0.16 0.43 70 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA -1.19 2 0.25 -1.65 4 0.18 -1.42 2 
ERITREA -1.03 8 0.25 -1.84 2 0.17 -1.44 2 
ESTONIA 1.82 95 0.33 1.13 87 0.12 1.48 95 
ETHIOPIA -0.62 28 0.20 -0.78 28 0.17 -0.70 23 
FIJI -0.28 51 0.35 0.62 64 0.17 0.17 60 
FINLAND 1.70 94 0.34 1.40 98 0.16 1.55 96 
FRANCE 1.77 95 0.34 1.07 83 0.16 1.42 94 
GABON -0.68 24 0.21 -0.71 30 0.17 -0.69 24 
GAMBIA -0.66 25 0.20 -0.68 32 0.16 -0.67 25 
GEORGIA -0.34 47 0.32 -0.11 46 0.12 -0.23 42 
GERMANY 1.47 92 0.31 1.14 88 0.16 1.30 92 
GHANA -0.27 52 0.19 0.75 68 0.16 0.24 63 
GREECE 0.21 66 0.34 0.74 68 0.16 0.47 72 
GRENADA -0.73 19 0.35 1.14 88 0.20 0.21 62 
GUATEMALA -0.25 52 0.31 -0.38 39 0.16 -0.32 38 
GUINEA -0.84 15 0.25 -0.90 23 0.18 -0.87 16 
GUINEA-BISSAU -0.96 9 0.25 -0.60 34 0.17 -0.78 22 
GUYANA -0.21 54 0.35 0.91 76 0.18 0.35 65 
HAITI -0.88 13 0.35 -1.17 13 0.17 -1.03 10 
HONDURAS -0.45 40 0.32 -0.11 45 0.16 -0.28 39 
HONG KONG 1.00 84 0.46 0.72 67 0.38 0.86 82 
HUNGARY 0.86 82 0.32 0.87 73 0.12 0.86 82 
ICELAND 0.89 83 0.34 1.43 99 0.17 1.16 90 
INDIA 0.72 78 0.29 0.23 53 0.16 0.48 73 
INDONESIA 0.35 69 0.28 -0.28 41 0.16 0.03 55 
IRAN -0.40 44 0.35 -1.42 9 0.17 -0.91 12 
IRAQ -0.82 16 0.37 -0.95 21 0.17 -0.89 13 
IRELAND 1.67 93 0.34 1.04 81 0.16 1.35 93 
ISRAEL 1.47 91 0.34 0.72 67 0.16 1.09 89 
ITALY 1.31 88 0.31 0.65 65 0.16 0.98 87 
IVORY COAST -0.81 16 0.25 -0.69 32 0.17 -0.75 22 
JAMAICA 0.41 72 0.34 1.03 81 0.16 0.72 79 
JAPAN 1.48 92 0.31 1.08 84 0.16 1.28 91 
JORDAN 0.38 70 0.30 -0.71 31 0.16 -0.16 43 
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KAZAKHSTAN -0.17 57 0.33 -1.23 13 0.12 -0.70 24 
KENYA -0.54 33 0.19 -0.33 40 0.16 -0.43 36 
KIRIBATI -1.01 9 0.38 0.71 66 0.20 -0.15 45 
KOREA, NORTH -1.33 1 0.37 -2.14 0 0.17 -1.73 0 
KOREA, SOUTH 1.36 89 0.32 0.59 63 0.16 0.98 86 
KUWAIT -0.47 38 0.37 -0.56 36 0.17 -0.51 32 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC -0.51 35 0.35 -1.05 18 0.12 -0.78 21 
LAOS -1.11 5 0.35 -1.65 4 0.17 -1.38 3 
LATVIA 0.51 73 0.34 1.12 86 0.12 0.81 81 
LEBANON -0.31 48 0.35 -0.85 25 0.18 -0.58 28 
LESOTHO -0.47 38 0.21 0.35 56 0.17 -0.06 49 
LIBERIA -1.36 0 0.37 -1.03 18 0.17 -1.19 6 
LIBYA -1.09 6 0.37 -1.86 2 0.17 -1.48 1 
LIECHTENSTEIN 0.25 67 0.41 1.31 93 0.20 0.78 80 
LITHUANIA 0.83 81 0.34 1.07 82 0.12 0.95 84 
LUXEMBOURG 0.70 77 0.35 1.31 94 0.18 1.01 87 
MACEDONIA -0.11 59 0.34 -0.13 44 0.12 -0.12 47 
MADAGASCAR -0.49 37 0.25 0.20 52 0.16 -0.15 46 
MALAWI -0.68 24 0.20 -0.14 44 0.16 -0.41 37 
MALAYSIA 0.63 74 0.33 -0.88 24 0.16 -0.13 47 
MALDIVES -0.05 61 0.35 -0.78 27 0.19 -0.42 36 
MALI -0.56 32 0.20 0.67 65 0.16 0.06 56 
MALTA 0.83 81 0.36 1.10 85 0.19 0.97 85 
MARSHALL ISLANDS -0.56 32 0.38 1.31 93 0.20 0.37 67 
MAURITANIA -0.61 29 0.25 -1.08 16 0.16 -0.84 17 
MAURITIUS -0.20 56 0.20 0.82 70 0.16 0.31 64 
MEXICO 1.60 93 0.26 0.29 54 0.17 0.94 83 
MICRONESIA -1.04 7 0.35 1.04 82 0.20 0.00 53 
MOLDOVA -0.01 62 0.35 -0.52 36 0.12 -0.26 40 
MONACO  -0.21 55 0.41 1.27 92 0.20 0.53 76 
MONGOLIA -0.21 54 0.33 0.41 58 0.17 0.10 57 
MOROCCO -0.22 53 0.20 -0.67 33 0.16 -0.44 35 
MOZAMBIQUE -0.49 36 0.20 0.01 47 0.16 -0.24 40 
MYANMAR -0.63 27 0.37 -2.03 1 0.17 -1.33 3 
NAMIBIA -0.36 46 0.19 0.42 59 0.16 0.03 55 
NAURU -1.12 3 0.41 0.80 69 0.20 -0.16 44 
NEPAL 0.03 64 0.33 -0.94 21 0.17 -0.46 34 
NETHERLANDS 1.75 94 0.34 1.34 95 0.16 1.55 95 
NEW ZEALAND 1.88 96 0.34 1.37 96 0.16 1.63 97 
NICARAGUA 0.16 66 0.27 0.57 62 0.16 0.36 66 
NIGER -0.78 18 0.21 -0.35 39 0.17 -0.57 29 
NIGERIA -0.51 34 0.20 -0.43 37 0.16 -0.47 33 
NORWAY 1.44 90 0.34 1.42 98 0.16 1.43 94 
OMAN -0.04 62 0.37 -1.27 12 0.17 -0.65 25 
PAKISTAN 0.23 67 0.34 -0.70 31 0.16 -0.24 41 
PALAU -0.70 22 0.41 1.35 96 0.20 0.33 65 
PANAMA 0.70 76 0.31 0.02 48 0.16 0.36 66 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA -0.61 30 0.35 0.90 75 0.18 0.15 59 
PARAGUAY -0.09 60 0.34 -0.01 47 0.16 -0.05 50 
PERU 0.73 79 0.29 0.50 61 0.16 0.61 77 
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PHILIPPINES 1.41 89 0.30 0.48 60 0.16 0.95 84 
POLAND 1.09 87 0.31 0.96 78 0.12 1.03 88 
PORTUGAL 1.47 91 0.31 1.22 90 0.16 1.35 92 
QATAR -0.86 14 0.37 -0.73 30 0.18 -0.79 21 
ROMANIA 0.41 71 0.31 0.07 49 0.12 0.24 62 
RUSSIA 0.09 64 0.29 -0.82 25 0.11 -0.36 37 
RWANDA -0.47 39 0.25 -1.30 11 0.17 -0.89 13 
WESTERN SAMOA -0.51 34 0.35 0.83 70 0.20 0.16 60 
SAN MARINO -0.89 11 0.37 1.23 91 0.20 0.17 61 
SAO TOME AND 
PRINCIPE -0.92 10 0.25 0.68 66 0.20 -0.12 48 
SAUDI ARABIA -0.33 47 0.37 -1.50 7 0.17 -0.91 11 
SENEGAL -0.46 39 0.21 0.33 55 0.17 -0.06 50 
SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO -0.29 49 0.37 0.17 51 0.12 -0.06 49 
SEYCHELLES -0.64 26 0.25 -0.26 41 0.19 -0.45 35 
SIERRA LEONE -0.69 22 0.25 -0.42 38 0.18 -0.56 30 
SINGAPORE 1.85 96 0.35 -0.88 24 0.16 0.49 74 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 0.70 77 0.32 0.89 75 0.12 0.80 81 
SLOVENIA 1.20 87 0.30 1.00 79 0.12 1.10 90 
SOLOMON ISLANDS -0.89 11 0.35 0.61 64 0.20 -0.14 46 
SOMALIA -1.16 3 0.41 -1.36 10 0.18 -1.26 5 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.38 70 0.19 0.85 71 0.16 0.61 77 
SPAIN 1.05 86 0.34 1.02 80 0.16 1.04 88 
SRI LANKA 0.43 73 0.34 -0.21 42 0.16 0.11 58 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS -0.70 21 0.35 0.94 77 0.20 0.12 58 
ST. LUCIA -0.09 61 0.35 1.34 95 0.20 0.62 78 
ST. VINCENT AND THE 
GRENADINES -0.27 51 0.35 1.22 89 0.20 0.48 73 
SUDAN -0.83 15 0.25 -1.54 6 0.17 -1.18 6 
SURINAME -1.08 7 0.36 1.08 83 0.20 0.00 54 
SWAZILAND -0.80 17 0.21 -1.27 11 0.17 -1.03 9 
SWEDEN 1.91 97 0.34 1.44 99 0.16 1.67 98 
SWITZERLAND 1.41 90 0.35 1.38 97 0.16 1.40 93 
SYRIA -1.04 8 0.37 -1.48 8 0.17 -1.26 4 
TAIWAN 1.23 88 0.54 0.87 74 0.16 1.05 89 
TAJIKISTAN -0.72 20 0.35 -1.01 19 0.12 -0.87 16 
TANZANIA -0.45 40 0.20 -0.22 42 0.16 -0.34 38 
THAILAND 0.72 79 0.33 0.24 54 0.16 0.48 74 
TIMOR, EAST -0.30 49 0.43 0.60 63 0.18 0.15 59 
TOGO -0.57 30 0.25 -1.24 12 0.17 -0.90 12 
TONGA -0.64 27 0.35 0.06 49 0.20 -0.29 39 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 0.02 63 0.34 0.86 72 0.16 0.44 71 
TUNISIA -0.24 53 0.25 -1.37 9 0.16 -0.81 20 
TURKEY 0.86 82 0.30 -0.32 40 0.16 0.27 63 
TURKMENISTAN -1.12 4 0.38 -1.78 3 0.12 -1.45 1 
TUVALU -1.22 1 0.41 1.02 80 0.20 -0.10 48 
UGANDA -0.29 50 0.20 -0.18 43 0.16 -0.24 41 
UKRAINE 0.81 80 0.31 -0.89 23 0.12 -0.04 51 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES -0.10 60 0.36 -1.16 15 0.16 -0.63 26 
UNITED KINGDOM 2.36 98 0.34 1.12 87 0.16 1.74 99 
UNITED STATES 2.78 100 0.31 1.28 93 0.16 2.03 100 
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URUGUAY 0.15 65 0.33 0.87 73 0.16 0.51 75 
UZBEKISTAN -0.76 19 0.38 -1.51 7 0.12 -1.13 7 
VANUATU -0.89 12 0.35 0.87 72 0.20 -0.01 53 
VENEZUELA -0.43 41 0.30 -0.64 33 0.16 -0.53 31 
VIETNAM -0.42 42 0.34 -1.61 5 0.16 -1.02 10 
WEST BANK GAZA -0.55 33 0.77 -1.51 6 0.19 -1.03 9 
YEMEN -0.70 21 0.35 -0.97 20 0.17 -0.83 18 
ZAMBIA -0.49 36 0.20 -0.58 35 0.16 -0.54 30 
ZIMBABWE -0.64 26 0.20 -1.77 3 0.16 -1.21 5 
Num. obs 194     194     194   
Min -1.36    -2.14   -1.73   
Max 2.78    1.45    2.03   
Average 0.00    0.00    0.00   
Std Dev 0.90     0.99     0.83   
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Appendix 3. Results of the regression analysis 
 
Table A1. Transparency and Corruption 
  
  Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption (KK) Dependent Variable: Composite Bribery (EOS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
UCM 
Institutional 
Transparency 
0.38   0.38    0.31   0.34    
  5.29***   5.26***    3.70***   4.11***    
UCM Political 
Transparency   0.41   0.41     0.21   0.24   
    6.72***   6.66***     3.61***   4.03***   
UCM Overall 
Transparency    0.57   0.58    0.37   0.41 
     7.16***   7.27***    3.97***   4.58*** 
Administrative 
regulations 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.52 
  6.81*** 6.98*** 7.56*** 6.40*** 7.04*** 7.34*** 7.78*** 8.55*** 8.74*** 7.91*** 8.97*** 9.22*** 
Economic 
Expectations -0.08 -0.06 -0.07     -0.13 -0.11 -0.12     
  1.22 1.04 1.32     1.97* 1.62 1.73*     
GDP per 
capita (PPP) 1.16 1.26 0.98 1.13 1.23 0.94 1.26 1.46 1.24 1.15 1.36 1.11 
  7.76*** 11.42*** 7.54*** 7.33*** 10.74*** 6.95*** 8.69*** 14.28*** 9.02*** 7.95*** 13.44*** 8.38*** 
Growth Rates 
2001-2003     -0.01 -0.01 -0.01     -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
      0.49 0.63 1.02     2.86*** 2.45** 2.89*** 
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
Adj R-
squared 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.8 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.83 
 
 
T-stats in italics below each coefficient estimate; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level  
 
Sources: Administrative Regulations, Economic Expectations and Composite Bribery (average of 7 categories), drawn from EOS 
2004, range from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). GDP per capita (PPP, log) drawn from Heston-Summers and CIA Factbook. Growth rates 
drawn from WDI 2004. Control of Corruption (drawn from KK 2004) ranges from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best).   
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Table A2. Institutional Transparency  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T-ratios in italics.  A constant term was used in all regressions but not shown here 
1 2 3 4 5
UCM Institutional 
Transparency 0.61 0.25 0.37 0.34 0.66
8.59*** 3.93*** 1.14 4.75*** 2.02**
Political Rights 0.14 0.11 0.16 -0.01 0.04
5.14*** 5.43*** 3.79*** 0.37 0.85
Political Rights * Institutional 
Transparency 0.04 0.01
0.85 0.25
GDP per capita (PPP) 1.05 1.12 
10.36*** 7.61*** 
Observations 188 188 188 103 103
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.73 0.59 0.77 0.61
Dep Variable: Control of Corruption Dep Variable: Global Competitiveness Index
  
 60
Table A3. Political Transparency  
 
  
T-ratios in italics.  A constant term was used in all regressions but not shown here 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
UCM Political 
Transparency 0.61 0.44 -0.37 0.05 -1.28 -0.24
3.80*** 3.63*** 2.01** 0.34 2.87*** 0.69
Political Rights 0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.01 0.19 -0.04
0.41 0.68 2.22** 0.20 2.43** 0.59
Political Rights * 
Political Transparency 0.20 0.08 0.31 0.11
6.58*** 3.10*** 5.16*** 2.14**
GDP per capita 
(PPP) 1.26 1.15 1.23
12.88*** 9.96*** 7.24***
Observations 188 188 188 188 103 103
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.72 0.52 0.74 0.56 0.77
Dep Variable: Global 
Competitiveness IndexDep Variable: Control of Corruption
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Table A4. Transparency indexes and Governance indicators, 2004 
 
 Gov. Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Control of Corruption 
GNI per cap 0.55*** 0.10** 0.64***
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.05)
Ec/Inst Transp  0.56*** 0.09 0.31***
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.08)
Pol Transp 0.12** 1.05*** 0.24***
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant -0.01 0.02 -0.02
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
# obs 165 165 164
R2 0.82 0.81 0.81
 
 ** indicates significance at .05 level and *** at .01 level. Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Government effectiveness, Voice & Accountability and Control of Corruption: KKZ 2004. 
 
 
Table A5. Overall transparency and number of radios per capita 
 
 All countries OECD  Non-OECD 
GNI per cap 0.34*** 0.17** 0.38***
 (0.88) (0.67) (0.19)
Radio per cap 0.35*** 0.05 0.99***
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.25)
Constant 0.00 1.79 0.22
 (0.08) (0.21) (0.11)
# obs 43 7 36
R2 0.67 0.75 0.52
 
 ** indicates significance at .05 level and *** at .01 level. Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Radio per capita: World Development Indicators, 2003.  
 
 
Table A6. Transparency and Human development indicators 
 
 Life Expectancy Fem. Literacy Immunization 
GNI per cap 0.42*** 0.62*** 0.31***
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.09)
Transparency 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.27***
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.14)
Constant -0.02 0.21 0.10
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06)
# obs 164 76 163
R2 0.43 0.36 0.24
 
 ** indicates significance at .05 level and *** at .01 level.  
Source: Life expectancy, Female Literacy and Immunization: World Development Indicators, 2003.  
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Appendix 3. Additional graphs. 
 
 
Graph A1. Control of Corruption and Overall Transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Control of Corruption: KK04, Overall Transparency Index 2005. 
 
 
 
 
Graph A2. Transparency vs. Life expectancy 
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Sources: Life expectancy: World Development Indicators 2002, Overall Transparency Index 2005, 
#countries 185.
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Graph A3. Ec/Institutional Transparency vs Female Literacy Rate  
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Graph A4. Radios per 1000 hab. vs. Overall Transparency Index 
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R2= 0.57 
Sources: Female Literacy Rate: World Development Indicators 2002, Ec/Institutional Transparency Index 2005, 
#countries 185 
r = 0.65 
Sources: Radio per 1000 people (World Development Indicators 2002); Overall transparency Index 2005, 
#countries 49. 
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Appendix 4. Components of Aggregate Transparency Indicators 
 
 
Table A5. Economic/Institutional Transparency 
Variable Coverage Concept measured 
Representative sources 
ET 2004 worldwide Publication of economic variables 
UNE 2003 worldwide E-government 
EGOV 2004 worldwide E-government 
FOI 2004 worldwide Freedom of information laws 
CPEOS 2004 worldwide Communication of policy and transparency in public 
contracts 
Non-representative sources 
AIGII 2004 worldwide36 Access to information 
IBP 2004 Developing and 
transition economies 
Budget Transparency 
OCDE 2004 OCDE countries Budget Transparency 
IBPL 2003 Latin American 
countries 
Budget Transparency 
AGIT2004 African countries Transparency civil service 
CPIA 2003 developing countries Transparency, Accountability and Corruption Public 
Sector 
CPIAA 2003 African countries Transparency and Corruption Public Sector 
WCY 2004 OECD countries Transparency of policy 
 
 
Table A6. Political Transparency 
Variable Code Concepts measured 
Representative sources 
PDTI 2004 worldwide Political Funding disclosure 
PFEOS 2004 worldwide Transparency in political funding 
POL 2002 worldwide General openness of political institutions 
FRH 2004 worldwide Free Press 
HUM 2003 worldwide Freedom of speech 
RSF 2003 worldwide Free Press  
FPEOS 2004 worldwide Free Press 
Non-representative sources 
FP GII worldwide Free Press 
FP FHT transition economies Free Press 
                                                 
36 Variables from the Public Integrity Index have been considered as non-representative because the index 
only covers 25 countries, even though they are from all geographical regions.  
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Appendix 5. Sources of Transparency Data 
 
 
A1: African Development Bank (ADB) 
 
http://www.afdb.org/ 
 
The African Development Bank (ADB) is a major development bank in Africa. Established in 1963 in order to 
promote economic and social development, the Bank has grown into a $33 billion, multinational 
development bank, with 52 African countries and 24 other shareholders. 
 
The African Development Bank develops its own "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment" for its own 
Client sample. Similarly to the World Bank's CPIA, the ADB Indicators annually assess the quality of African 
Development Bank borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and 
poverty reduction. 
 
The variable included in the Ec/Institutional Transparency indicator is “Transparency / corruption” 
A2: Centre for Public Integrity (CPI) 
 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/ga/ 
 
The Center for Public Integrity is a nonprofit organization that conducts investigative research and reporting 
on public policy issues in the United States and around the world.  The Center has published a Public 
Integrity index assessing the institutions and practices that citizens can use to hold their governments 
accountable to the public interest including the following categories: 
1. Civil Society, Public Information and Media: Civil Society Organizations; Access to Information; Freedom 
of the Media.  
2. Electoral and Political Processes: National Elections; Election Monitoring Agency; Political Party Finances.  
3. Branches of Government: Executive; Legislature; Judiciary.  
4. Administration and Civil Service: Civil Service Regulations; Whistle-Blowing Measures; Procurement; 
Privatization.  
5. Oversight and Regulatory Mechanisms: National Ombudsman; Supreme Audit Institution; Taxes and 
Customs; Financial Sector Regulation.  
6. Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Rule of Law: Anti-Corruption Law; Anti-Corruption Agency; Anti-
Corruption Agency; Rule of Law and Access to Justice; Law Enforcement.  
It covers 25 countries around the world, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, the Philippines, 
Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. In each 
country, the Center for Public Integrity used teams of at least five researchers, working independently, to 
compile the material for the Country Reports. A country team typically consisted of a lead social scientist, an 
investigative journalist and five country readers forming a peer-review panel. 
Two variables from the category “Civil Society, Public Information and Media” were included in the following 
Transparency indicators: 
- Ec/Institutional Transparency:  “Access to Information”, ie. In law do citizens have a right of access to 
information? and In practice, is the right of access to information effective?  
- Political Transparency: “Freedom of the media”, ie. legal guarantees to free media and speech, the ability 
of citizens to form media entities and the ability of the media and journalists to report freely and safely when 
investigating corruption matters.  
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A3: Centre for Public Policy (Brown University)  
 
http://www.insidepolitics.org/egovt04int.pdf 
 
The Global E-Governance Index is compiled by the Brown University's Center for Public Policy and it covers 
1,935 national government websites for the 198 nations around the world. The Centre has published reports 
for 2001-2004. 
 
Official websites are evaluated for the presence of various features dealing with information availability, 
service delivery, and public access. Features assessed included the name of the nation, region of the world, 
and having the following features: online publications, online database, audio clips, video clips, non-native 
languages or foreign language translation, commercial advertising, premium fees, user payments, disability 
access, privacy policy, security features, presence of online services, number of different services, digital 
signatures, credit card payments, email address, comment form, automatic email updates, website 
personalization, personal digital assistant (PDA) access, and an English version of the website. 
 
Range for the E-Government index- 0 (bad)-100 (good) based on availability of publications and databases 
(72 points) and number of online services (28 points). 
Global E-governance Index was included in the Ec/Institutional Transparency sub-component.  
The main difference between Global E-Government Index and the one developed by United Nations, is that 
the later measures how well e-government serves human development and therefore focuses on web sites 
of ministries / departments dealing with health, education, social welfare, employment and finance. Global E-
Government Index addresses different scope of activities and it does not measure e-participation. 
 
A4: CIRI Human Rights Database 
 
www.humanrightsdata.com 
 
The Cingranelli & Richards Human Rights Database contains standards-based quantitative information on 
government respect for 13 internationally recognized human rights for 195 countries, annually from 1981-
2003. It contains measures of government human rights practices, not human rights policies or human rights 
conditions.  CIRI currently includes measures of the practices of governments that allow or impede citizens 
who wish to exercise their:  
• Physical integrity rights--the rights not to be tortured, summarily executed, disappeared, or imprisoned 
for political beliefs. The scores of these variables can be summed to form a statistically valid cumulative 
scale (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001).    
• Civil liberties such as free speech, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of movement, 
freedom of religion, and the right to participate in the selection of government leaders. The scores of 
some of these variables can be summed to form a statistically valid cumulative scale (Richards, 
Gelleny, and Sacko, 2001).  
• Workers’ rights  
• Rights of women to equal treatment politically, economically, and socially.  
The variable included in the Political Transparency indicator is “Freedom of Speech”. This variable indicates 
the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including 
ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, 
speech or expression. Expression may be in the form of art or music. 
 
A5: Freedominfo 
 
www.freedominfo.org 
Freedominfo is a virtual network that links freedom of information movements around the world in their 
struggle for greater openness.  The site is a one-stop portal that describes best practices, consolidates 
lessons learned, explains campaign strategies and tactics, and links the efforts of freedom of information 
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advocates around the world. It contains crucial information on freedom of information laws and how they 
were drafted and implemented, including how various provisions have worked in practice. 
The freedominfo.org site is edited by a multinational volunteer Editorial Board, and is hosted and staffed by 
George Washington University's National Security Archive, the leading non-profit user and advocate of the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Grants from the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, the John S. 
and James L. Knight Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation underwrite the 
site. The “Global Survey- Freedom of Information and Access to Government Records Around the World” 
was compiled by David Banisar of the University of Leeds and Privacy International. The survey describes 
the situation of freedom of information laws in each country as in October 2004.  
The information contained in the survey was included in the Ec/Institutional Transparency indicator with the 
following codification: 2 = Comprehensive access law enacted, 1 = Pending effort to enact law and 0 =No 
operative law.  
 
 
A6: Freedom House (FRH, FHT) 
 
http://www.freedomhouse.org 
 
Freedom House is a non-governmental organization which promotes democratic values around the world. 
Freedom House was established in 1941 and is headquartered in New York City. 
We rely on data from two Freedom House publications. "Freedom in the World” which was launched in 1955 
and became an annual publication in 1978, covering 192 countries and/or related and disputed territories 
and "Nations in Transit" which was launched in 1995 and covers 28 post-communist countries.   
  
Freedom House develops its assessments using a team of academic advisors, in-house experts, published 
resources, and local correspondents including human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures. 
Freedom House staff also conduct regular fact-finding missions to countries being assessed. An academic 
advisory board provides input to the project in general. 
 
Freedom in the World (FRH)  
 
This publication evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world. 
Freedom House defines political rights as those freedoms that enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, and civil liberties as the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy 
apart from the state. For all countries, the subjective assessments are based on checklists of rights and 
freedoms. A Freedom House team assigns a rating to each item on the checklist and produces an initial 
assessment for each country. The team then assess whether the checklists might have missed an important 
factor for a particular country. The scores are then reviewed to ensure quality and consistency across 
countries and a final rating is produced. 
 
The variable included in the Political Transparency indicator is “Freedom of the Press” which includes   
- Laws and Practice: Assess whether or not dissent is allowed, if private media are permitted alongside 
governmental broadcasting, if independent media, in practice, are permitted to express diverse views 
- Political Influence over Media Content: This category reflects political pressure on the content of both 
privately owned and government media, and takes into account the day-to-day conditions in which 
journalists work, threats from organized crime, or from religious extremists, for example, often generate self-
censorship and so negatively affect the media environment 
- Economic influence over Media Content: Influence may come from the government or from private 
entrepreneurs. This reflects competitive pressures in the private sector that distort reportage as well as 
economic favoritism or reprisals by government for unwanted press coverage 
- Actual Incident of Violations of Press Freedom: Murders, arrests, suspension and other violations create a 
sense of fear which may discourage objective reporting 
  
Freedom House Nations in Transit (FNT). This publication evaluates the progress in democratic and 
economic reform in post-communist countries. Country surveys are written by Freedom House staff or 
consultants and are reviewed by academics and senior Freedom House staff. Each report is divided into 
nine sections, ranging from the political process to progress in price liberalization. For each section, a 
preliminary rating is based on a checklist of issues. The academic oversight board establishes the final 
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ratings by consensus following extensive discussions and debate, which are reviewed by the Freedom 
House rating committee. 
 
The variable included in the Political Transparency indicator is “Independent Media” which includes: Press 
freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, and independence of those sources from undue 
government or other influences. 
 
 
A7: International Budget Project (IBP) 
 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/ 
 
The International Budget Project was formed within the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in 1997 to 
nurture the growth of civil society capacity to analyze and influence government budget processes, 
institutions and outcomes.  The overarching aim of the project is to make budget systems more responsive 
to the needs of society and, accordingly, to make these systems more transparent and accountable to the 
public. 
 
Open Budget Initiative 
The Open Budget Questionnaire is an independent assessment of public access to budget information from 
the perspective of civil society organizations. The Questionnaire also covers other budget transparency 
issues in order to explore ways of improving public understanding and involvement in the budget. IBP has 
worked with independent groups to apply the method in 36 countries and plans to expand coverage to 60 
countries in the next two years 
In 2004 the Open Budget Questionnaire was carried out in 36 countries: Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
 
An average simple was calculated with the 3 categories of the Open Budget and included in the 
Ec/Institutional indicator: 
• Executive Budget Documents (availability of) (Budget year and beyond, Prior year and before, 
Comprehensiveness) 
• Monitoring and Evaluation Reports (availability of) (In-year monitoring reports, End-of-year 
evaluation reports) 
• Encouraging Public and Legislative Involvement (Highlighting policy and performance goals, 
Involvement of legislature, Facilitating public discourse and understanding) 
Score: 100 (good) - 0 (bad) 
The Latin American Index of Budget Transparency 2003 
 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/LA03.htm 
 
Organizations in ten Latin American released the results of a year-long study on budget transparency and 
participation in their countries.  The effort was coordinated by Fundar, a Mexican non-governmental 
organization, and leading non-governmental organizations and academic researchers in the following 
countries have participated: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Peru.  
 
4 expert panels (Legislators, Media, Academic experts, NGOs) are asked to evaluate different aspects of the 
budget process in their countries such as access to budget information, citizen’s participation and credibility 
of institutions. Each country receives an overall transparency rating from 1 to 100, with 100 being highly 
transparent 
 
The following variables are included in the index: Citizen participation, Role and participation of the 
legislature, Information on macroeconomic criteria, Budget allocation, Changes in the budget, Budget 
  
 69
oversight, Capacities of external control body, Credibility of the internal comptroller, Accountability,  
Supervision of federal officials, Information on federal debt, Quality of information and statistics,  
Responsibilities among governmental levels and Timelines of information 
 
The index was included in the Ec/Institutional Transparency indicator. 
 
A8: Institute for Management Development (WCY) 
 
http://www.imd.ch 
 
The Institute for Management Development is an research and educational organization based in Lausanne, 
Switzerland. It has published the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1987. Until 1996, this was a joint 
effort with the World Economic Forum. The World Competitiveness Yearbook analyzes the competitive 
environment in 47 countries. It is based on both objective data and surveys of perceptions. The survey 
questions over 4,000 local and foreign enterprises operating in the countries under analysis. Mean scores 
on the survey questions are reported in the yearbook for all countries. In the table below we list the 
questions included in the governance database. 
 
The variable included in the Ec/institutional Transparency indicator is Transparency of Government policy 
  
A9: OECD/WB Budget Practices and Procedures Survey 
 
http://ocde.dyndns.org/ 
 
It includes 44 Countries: Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Ireland, Jordan. Morocco, Peru, South 
Africa, Turkey, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Kenya, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
UK, Australia, Cambodia, Czech Republic, France, Iceland, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, 
Suriname, USA, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Uruguay. 
 
For the Ec/Institutional Transparency index, questions related to the following categories were included ias a 
simple average:   
 
- Procurement (Do public procurement procedures define standard practices for bid deposit, bid opening, 
evaluation, publications and record-keeping? Are there standardized procedures manuals, forms and 
documents made available to contracting entities and training establishments? and special programmes to 
disseminate information and training to potential bidders in the private sector? Are compliance with 
procurement regulations audited? Is there a minimum threshold value above which “open and competitive” 
tender procedures must be used?) 
- Internal Control and Internal Auditing (Are internal audit procedures clear and subject to effective process 
review by external auditors? Are all spending units required to have an internal audit unit if they are not 
served by that of a line ministry? Are the internal audit reports made available to the external auditor?) 
- Budgeting, Accounting and Financial reporting (Are audited final accounts published and available 
publicly?, Are government entities subject to financial audits by an external auditor?, Are the findings of the 
National Audit Body available to the public?, Are audit results circulated and discussed in Parliament?, How 
are the subjects of audits determined?, Is there a system to track audit recommendations once issued?)  
- Budget Documentation (Is the Budget Document presented to the Legislature comprehensive?, Is the 
budget documentation placed on the Internet?)  
- Types of Data Reported in Budget Documents (Do budget documents cover extra-budgetary funds and 
activities? Is there a legal framework for the ways that extrabudgetary activities are managed and 
reported?), 
- Performance information (Are performance results made available to the public?, Is the performance data 
externally audited) 
- Control and audit of budget practices and processes of government agencies (Internal audit is made 
regularly in most government agencies?, Are external audits made public?),  
- Reporting on and Audit of Finances for the Judiciary (Is there an internal audit of the judiciary’s financial 
management systems?, Are financial reports on revenues collected subject to external audit?), Donor 
Funding and the Budget (Are donor funds “on-budget”?, Is information on donor conditionalities published?  
 
  
 70
A10: Polity IV Project 
 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity 
 
The Polity IV dataset includes 161 contemporary countries, including all countries where the 2002 
population exceeds five hundred thousand. The long-established members of the international system are 
coded beginning in 1800. More recently established countries are coded for the year in which their first 
independent government was formed--usually the year of independence, sometimes a few years earlier or 
later. 
 
The variable included in the political transparency index is Institutionalized Democracy where democracy is 
conceived as three essential, interdependent elements: 
a. the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about alternative policies and leaders.  
b. the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.  
c. the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.  
 
The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) calculated as the weighted average of 
competitiveness of political participation, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive. 
  
 
A11: Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
 
http://www.rsf.org 
 
Reporters Without Borders - headquartered in Paris - is an international organization dedicated to the 
protection of reporters and respect of press freedom in the world. In 2002, International Reporters Without 
Borders published its first worldwide press freedom index, compiled for 139 countries. The organisation's 
initiatives are being carried out on five continents through its national branches and its offices in Abidjan, 
Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Istanbul, Montreal, Nairobi, New York, Tokyo and Washington. It also works in 
close co-operation with local and regional press freedom organisations and with members of the "Reporters 
without Borders' Network." 
 
The index was drawn up by asking journalists, researchers and legal experts worldwide to answer 50 
questions about the whole range of press freedom violations (such as murders or arrests of journalists, 
censorship, pressure, state monopolies in various fields, punishment of press law offences and regulation of 
the media). 
 
The Press Freedom Index from RSF was included in the Political Transparency indicator. 
 
A12: Transparency International (TI) 
 
www.transparency.org 
 
Transparency International is a non-governmental organization devoted to combating corruption. The Global 
Corruption Report (2004) published by Transparency International focuses on corruption in the political 
process, and on the impact of corrupt politics on public life in societies across the globe. The report includes 
an assessment prepared by Michael Pinto-Duschinsky on Political Finance Disclosure programs in 119 
countries.   
 
The information from the database was included in the Political Transparency indicator with the following 
codification:  
4- High disclosure- ie. Countries where three categories of disclosure are required: 
a. disclosure by political parties of income and/or expenditure accounts 
b. disclosure by candidates of income and/or expenditure accounts 
c. disclosure of the identity of donors to political parties 
3- Medium disclosure: only two types 
2- Low disclosure (only one kind of disclosure) 
1- Hidden disclosure (Government see financial reports but not public) 
0- No disclosure 
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A13: United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa (UNECA) 
 
http://www.uneca.org/ 
 
Established in 1958, the Economic Commission for Africa is one of five regional commissions under the 
administrative direction of United Nations headquarters. As the regional arm of the UN in Africa, it is 
mandated to support the economic and social development of its 53 member States, foster regional 
integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development. 
 
The Africa Governance Indicators is the result of a study initiated by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa, as part of the first major continent-wide study to measure and monitor progress of 
governance in Africa, published in “Progress towards Good Governance in Africa.” The objective of the 
research was to ascertain current public perceptions of the state of governance in the region. By placing 
strong emphasis on local and national surveys, and incorporating the views of a wide cross-section of 
society, it aimed not only to take a snapshot of the perception of governance in various countries, but also to 
highlight key capacity deficits and encourage the sharing of intraregional experience and knowledge on the 
challenges to good governance 
 
The following African Governance Indicator was included in the Ec/Institutional sub-component: “Civil 
service transparency / accountability”. 
 
 
A14: United Nations, World Public Sector Report  
 
http://www.unpan.org/dpepa_worldpareport.asp 
 
The World Public Sector Report, 2003, E-Government at the Crossroads includes a survey on the use of 
Information Communication Technologies by Government in the following areas: general, education, health, 
social welfare, finance and employment.  The survey was carried out among the 191 Member States (173 
with internet presence, 18 without internet presence)  
  
In the Ec/Transparency indicator two indexes were included as a simple average: 
E-Government Readiness Index (quantitative) 
-  capacity or aptitude of the public sector to use ICT 
- comprises Web Measure Index (presence/absence of specific electronic facilities/services available in 
official government site plus 5 additional Ministries), Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (weighted 
average of PCs, internet users, phone lines, online population, mobile phones and TVs per 1000 persons), 
and Human Capital Index (adult literacy and enrolment ratio). 
  
E-Participation Index (qualitative) 
-  willingness, on part of the government, to provide high quality information/service and effective tools for 
citizens’ participation. 
- assessment of a total of 21 citizen informative and participatory services/facilities in e-information, e-
consultation and e-decision making on a scale on 0-4. 
  
 
A15: World Bank (WB) 
 
http://www.worldbank.org 
 
Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) annually assess the quality of World Bank 
borrowers’ policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Country assessments began in the World Bank in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of lending 
resources. The methodology has evolved over time, reflecting lessons learned and mirroring the evolution of 
the development paradigm. While in earlier years assessments focused mainly on macroeconomic policies, 
they now include other factors relevant to poverty reduction, such as social inclusion, equity and 
governance. 
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The CPIA consists of equally weighted criteria representing the policy dimensions of an effective poverty 
reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped in four clusters. Cluster A, Economic Management, 
covers economic policies. Cluster B, Structural Policies, covers a broad range of structural policies: trade 
policies, financial depth, market competition, and environmental sustainability. Cluster C, Policies for Social 
Inclusion and Equity, focuses on social equity and broad-based growth, and aims to capture the extent to 
which a country's policies and institutions ensure that the benefits of growth are widespread, contribute to 
the accumulation of social capital, and direct public programs to poor people and reduce their vulnerability to 
various kinds of shocks. 
 
Cluster D, Public Sector Management and Institutions, aims to capture key aspects of good governance. For 
each of the criteria, countries are assessed on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The ratings are prepared by the 
World Bank's country economists and focus on the quality of the country's current policies and institutions, 
which are the main determinants of the present prospects for aid effectiveness. The rating assigned for each 
criterion reflects a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments: ratings are based on country 
knowledge obtained from country dialogue and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process, the 
available body of economic and sector work (ESW), project preparation and supervision, and project and 
CAS monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The variable included in the Ec/Institutional Transparency indicator is “Transparency, accountability and 
corruption in public sector” 
 
Islam Economic Transparency Index 
 
http://imagebank.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/07/08/000094946_030621043015
53/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf 
 
The Economic Transparency index published by R. Islam assesses how much economic information 
Government is willing to disclose by evaluating availability on official web site, World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) or International Financial Statistics (IMF) of the following variables at the “desirable” frequency 
level: 
• GDP 
• Unemployment 
• CPI 
• Imports 
• FDI 
• Exchange rate 
• Government revenue (Central Government fiscal revenue) 
• Government expenditure 
• Money supply (M2) 
• Deposit interest rate 
 
The index is currently being updated. 2002 index includes 169 countries (145 developing, 24 developed).  
 
 
A16: World Economic Forum (WEF) 
http://www.weforum.org 
 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is an independent, not-for-profit organization bringing together top 
leaders from business, government, academia and the media to address key economic, social and political 
issues in partnership. The WEF was founded in 1971 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Since 1996, the WEF has sponsored the Global Competitiveness Report, an annual publication produced in 
collaboration with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). As background for this report, 
the WEF conducts the Global Competitiveness Survey, which measures the perceptions of business 
executives about the country in which they operate. The survey asks top managers to rank on a 1 to 7 scale 
their opinion on issues in eight broad areas: 1) Openness, 2) Government, 3) Finance, 4) Infrastructure, 5) 
Technology, 6) Management, 7) Labor, and 8) Institutions. 
 
In 1998 and 2002 the WEF sponsored separate surveys of countries in Africa and Middle East, respectively. 
We incorporated them in the Global Surveys, resulting in an increase of country coverage in 1998 and 2002 
of 20 and 8 countries, respectively. 
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Below we list the variables included in each of the transparency indicators: 
Ec/Institutional Transparency: 
- “Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies 
affecting their industry” 
- “When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms” 
(the simple average of these two questions was included in the aggregated sub-component)  
 
Political Transparency 
- “Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation” 
- “Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy outcomes” 
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